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RE: James Jackson Award 
I am submitting, for your committee's consideration for the first James 
Jackson Award for Excellence in Library Research, chapter four of Brian Shea-
han's anticipated 300-page plus study on American Athletics and the Law: The 
Sports Triangle. The entire manuscript is, of course, available to the com-
mittee if so desired; however, I feel chapter four is a representative sample 
of the quality of Brian's work and, in particular, exemplifies his broad and 
effective employment of library resources. Brian cites and makes use of court 
cases, congressional hearings, newspaper editorials, a cross-section of law 
and professional journals, and more standard secondary sources. Clearly he 
knows how to research a topic. 
Brian's overall project has to do with what he calls "The Sports Triangle," 
that is, the interrelationships among competition, legislation, and litigation 
when it comes to the regulation of American Athletics. Particular chapters 
(other than chapter four) deal with such topics as the relationship of the 
scholar athlete to the university (i.e. Employer- employee?), baseball's 
peculiar anti-trust status, the positive and negative effects of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, the dispute over who possesses broadcasting 
rights to college athletic events (i.e. the NCAA or the individual institutions), 
etc .. 
Needless to say I am most impressed with Brian's work. We've seldom had a 
project of this magnitude in Political Science. Also, knowing Jim Jackson as I 
did (including his interest in sports), I am sure that he too would be immen-
sely pleased with Brian's accomplishments. 
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(1) 
INTRODUCTION: 
Colleges and universities regularly award scholarships to outstanding young 
athletes. The standard financial aid agreement between the institution and the 
athlete is that in return for the athlete's active participation in the partie-
ular sport, he or she receives free tuition, room, board and books. 
In addition to the educational and athletic involvements, the giving of fi-
nancial aid has numerous implications on the relationship between the college or 
university and the athlete. Foremost among those implications~ is the potential 
legal entanglement under the law of workmen's compensation. 
The major questions which are in front of the courts today in conjunction 
with such legal entanglements are: 1) whether scholarship athletes are employees 
::;.r.... 
of the institution; 2) whether athletic grant-in-aid, conditioned upon athletic 
ability and participation, creates an employment relationship; and 3) whether an 
injured scholarship athlete is entitled to receive benefits under the various 
states' workmen's compensation acts. 
Recently, the supreme court of Indiana was faced with these questions in the 
1 
case of Fred W. Rensing v Indiana State University Board of Trustees. 
Rensing was a scholarship football player at Indiana State University. On 
April 24, 1976 he was taking part in the team's spring practice when he tackled a 
teammate during a punt coverage drill. Upon impact, Rensing suffered a fractural 
dislocation of the cervical spine at the level of 4-5 vertebrae. He was rendered 
a quadriplegic as a result of the injury. 
On August 22, 1977 Rensing filed a claim for workmen's compensation from the 
school's Board of Trustees through the full Industrial Board of Indiana. His claim 
was for recovery for permanent total disability as well as for medical and hospital 
expenses incurred due to the injury. 
(2) 
The Industrial Board rejected the claim on the grounds that an employer-
employee relationship did not exist between the athlete and the institution. As 
a result, the Board ruled that he was not entitled to benefits under Indiana's 
Workmen's Compensation Act, Indo Code 22-3-1-1 et. seq. 
Rensing then appealed the Industrial Board's decision to the Fourth District 
2 
Court of Appeals. That Court reversed the Industrial Board's decision by hol~ing 
that a scholarship athlete is indeed an employee protected under Indiana's Work-
men's Compensation Act. Therefore, remedies under the statute are available for 
Rensing's injury since it was incurred during participation in football practice. 
However, the Supreme Court of Indiana, on February 9, 1983, overruled the lower 
Court in finding that a contract of employment did not in fact exist between the 
athlete and the institution. 
It is the objective of this chapter to determine whether the financial aid 
agreement beteen the student-athlete and the institution constitutes an employment 
relationship. If so, is an injured athlete t~ecefoxe eligible to receive work-
men's compensation? 
In determining these questions, opinions from three related workmen's compen-
sation cases are examined. Also analyzed are opinions from1 scholarship athletes, 
college coaches, university professors, panelists from the "Law and Amateur Sports 
II" seminar, related scholarly materials, and the contrasting opinions of the two 
Courts in Rensing. 
RELATED WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES: 
As far back as the early 1950's, the notion of college athletes as employees 
3 
of the university has been argued in the courts. In University of Denver v Nemeth, 
a student-athlete was employed by the University as the manager of its tennis courts. 
4 
"His continued employment depended on the quality of his performance in football." 
Nemeth suffered an injury during spring football practice. Like Rensing, he 
(3) 
filed a claim for workmen's compensation. Nemeth differs from Rensing, though, in 
that he was not on scholarship. Nonetheless, he "had been hired by contract to 
5 
perform on campus and was required to play football as an incident to that work." 
As a result, the court ruled that a contract existed requiring that the University 
employ Nemeth as long as he participated on the football team. In fact, one wit-
ness testified that, "the man who produced in football would get the meals and the 
6 
job." 
Thus, his injury was ruled to have been an incident of his employment "even 
7 
if perriaps not in the course of employment." The State Supreme Court, therefore, 
affirmed the Industrial Commission award as compensible under the Colorado Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
It is important to note that although the student athlete was granted workmen's 
compensation, this is not a case involving an employment relationship through the 
signing of the familiar grant-in-aid scholarship. 
* * * 
The Colorado Supreme Court once again addressed this issue concerning workmen's 
8 
compensation in 1957. State Compensation Insurance Fund v Industrial Commission, 
involves the question of whether death benefits should be awarded to the widow of 
a scholarship athlete who was fatally injured while participating in a football 
game. 
A student was induced to give up his part-time job in order to play football 
at Ft. Lewis A & M College. The young athlete consented after the coach arranged 
for an athletic scholarship covering his tuition. In addition, another part-time 
up 
job was liuedAfor the athlete which would not conflict with his participation in 
football. 
The Colorado State Supreme Court felt that "since the student was already en-
rolled [at Ft. Lewis], there was no inducement in connection with football either 
(4) 
9 
in the job or for enrollment." Therefore, his scholarship and part-time job were 
not to be regarded as contingent upon his athletic ability or participation on the 
football team. 
As a result of the Court's contention that no contract existed, the compensation 
claim was discharged. In essence, the Court decided that "since the evidence does 
not disclose any contractual obligation to play football, the employer-employee re-
lationship does not exist and there is no contract which supports a claim for comp-
10 
ensation under the [Colorado Worlanen's Compesation Act]." 
* * * 
An athlete was killed in a plane crash while returning with his team from a 
regularly scheduled football game. The question before the Court in this case,(Van 
11 
Horn v Industrial Accident Commission), was whether the athlete had been an employee 
of the college within the meaning of the California Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Court emphasized the fact that, "the coach had told the player that if he 
would •.•• [play] football, he would receive $50 dollars each quarter plus rent 
12 
money during the football season." Therefore, there was a significant relation-
ship between the athlete's receiving aid for his athletic abilities and participa-
tion. This, in essence, constituted a contract of employment. 
As a result, the Court ruled that the widow and children of the deceased ath-
lete were entitled to workmen's compensation death benefits. In its ruling on be-
half of the athlete's dependents, the Court noted that, "[t]he only inference to be 
drawn from the evidence is that the descendant received the 'scholarship' because 
of his athletic prowess and participation. The form of remuneration is immaterial. 
A Court will look through form to determine whether consideration has been paid for 
13 
services." 
This decision appears to open a "Pandora's box" for future workmen's compen-
sation cases. However, the Court carefully limited its decision "to the facts in 
question and specifically noted that not all athletes who receive scholarships would 
(5) 
14 
be considered as employees of the donor institutions." 
* * 
In comparing these three cases with the Rensing case, one notes obvious dif-
ferences. In Nemeth and Van Horn, both received a non-athletic job in return for 
his football prowess and participation. Rensing was given no such benefit. Like-
wise, Rensing only sought "recovery for permanent total disability as well as medi-
15 
cal and hospital expenses incurred due to his injury." Yet, the State Compensation 
Insurance Fund and Van Horn cases involved claims for death benefits. 
However, these cases are important to examine because similarities can be drawn 
between them and the Rensing case. As noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeals, 
"in all three cases the 'student-athlete' received benefits from a university solely 
because of his athletic ability and participation on a football team. .[Like-
wiseJ, ~,the benefits received by Rensing were conditioned upon his athletic ability 
16 
and team participation." 
Although it is difficult to find a consistent view of the athlete-institution 
relationship through these Court decisions, a general rule may be made. "[A] col-
lege or university athlete will not be considered an employee simply because he or 
she is the recipient of an athletic scholarship or grant-in-aid. Where, however, the 
performance of athletic services is the quid pro quo for the scholarship or grant-
in-aid award, the athlete will be an employee for purposes of workmen's compensation 
. 17 
coverage." 
TWO PERSPECTIVES ON COLLEGE ATHLETICS: 
One of the most difficult aspects of sports law, is determining "whether the 
relationship between an athlete who receives financial aid 
18 
versity which grants it, is gratuitous or contractuaL 11 
and the college or uni-
~J. 
What  the problem 
of resolving this issue - and the related issue of determining the existence of an 
(6) 
employer-employee relationship within the bounds of workmen's compensation - is the 
lack of a consistent definition of "amateur" athletics. 
In the cases already described, the Court has had to decide how "to characterize 
the relationship between a student-athlete and the institution that provides him or 
19 
her with financial support." This is because "the relationship can be viewed from 
20 
either of two separate perspectives." 
The first perspective is the traditional academic relationship whereby athletics 
are merely a part of the institution's educational program. As a result, the financiaJ 
aid which is granted to the student-athlete, is seen solely as a vehicle for defraying 
the athlete's cost of an education. 
The Supreme Court of Indiana unquestionably took this traditional perspective 
in the Rensing case. In his opinion of the Court, Justice Hunter emphasized that, 
"(t]he-_fundamental concerns behind the policies of the NCAA are that intercollegiate 
athletics must be maintained as a part of the educational program and student-
athletes are integral parts of the institution's student body. An athlete receiving 
21 
financial aid is still first and foremost a student." 
David Abrams was one of the panelists at the "Law and Amateur Sports II" seminar 
sponsored by the Indiana University School of Law. In the late 1970's, Abrams was 
a standout defensive back for the Indiana University football team. He describes 
his relationship with the University from this traditional perspective: 
"The University used me for my football playing abilities. I knew 
that, and I accepted tha~. On the flip side of the coin, however, 
I looked at it this \vay: If I don't use them equally, then I'm going 
to be the one who loses in the deal. If I don't use every educational 
opportunity made available, what started out as a fair and equitable 
fcc\\~'(£ 
agreement ends up being very one-sided in the university's favor." 
What is noteworthy about Abrams' remarks, is that he accepted the fact that the 
University was going to make the most of his athletic prowess. Irregardless, he 
(7) 
was more concerned with taking advantage of the numerous educational opportunities 
the University could offer him in return for playing football. 
That is the traditional perspective on college athletics - using the athletic 
scholarship as a means ~ receiving a college education. 
* * * 
While the first perspective is the one which educators would most like to see 
prevail, there are many critics who see it as being too idealistic. While it would 
be refreshing if athletes receiving financial aid were in fact students~,_first and 
foremost) that is simply not the case in a great many situations. The reason for 
this untraditional commentary, is that college athletic departments have become bus-
inesses (and in many cases very big and profitable businesses). 
The proponents of this "college athletics as a business" perspective, do not 
view the athlete-institution relationship as merely using athletic participation as 
a vehicle to receiving a "free" education. Instead, they view it as a contractual 
arrangement in which the university receives the benefits of the athlete's talents 
in exchange for financial support given to the scholar-athlete. Therefore, athletics 
is not merely a part of the overall educational process. Rather, college athletics 
22 
is a part of the overall business activities conducted by the institution. 
The Court of Appeals took this perspective in its sympathetic decision for 
Rensing. Presiding Judge Miller made these observations in his opinion for the 
Court: 
"It is manifest from the record in this case at bar that maintaining 
a football team is an important aspect of the Universiy's overall 
business or profession of educating students, even if it may not be 
said such athletic endeavors themselves are the University's 'prin-
cipal' occupation. ••• we believe football competition must prop-
23 
erly be viewed as an aspect of the University's overall occupation." 
(8) 
Ronald J. Waicukauski, Law Professor at the Indiana University School of 
Law, also sees the athlete-institution relationship in contractual terms. He 
notes that there are numerous specific terms set forth by the NCAA, a school's 
athletic conference, and/or the individual institution. These terms are defined 
24 
in such contracts as the tender of financial aid, 
25 
the national letter of in-
tent, and other grant-in-aid documents. As a result, Prof. Waicukauski feels 
that, "the implications of all these terms is that there is a contractual agree-
ment between the scholarship athlete and the institution through the financial 
aid agreements." 
Prof. Waicukauski feels that this contractual relationship is very straight-
forward. He sees it as "an exchange, a transaction upon which both parties are 
bound. The exchange is for the services of the athlete for the reciprocal promise 
of the University to provide educational services to the athlete." 
Even Abrams acknowledges that there is a contractual relationstip within the 
business perspective of collegiate athletics. He recollected on the signing of 
his financial aid agreement with Indiana University in this way: 
"When I signed the grant-in-aid ••• I felt that I was making a con-
tract with the University. Basically it went like this: they made 
me an offer to provide me with a college education in return for my 
playing football for Indiana." 
One of the most significant court cases in this area took place in 1972. In 
26 
Taylor v Wake Forest University, the Court characterized the athlete-institution 
relationship in the same perspective as enunciated by Prof. Waicukauski and Abrams. 
Taylor quit playing football for the Demon Deacons because of low grades. 
Wake Forest responded by revoking his scholarship. However, the student-athlete 
sued the school because the financial aid agreement that he signed was for four 
27 
years. The Court for the first time ruled that athletic scholarships are indeed 
contracts. Nonetheless, the Court denied Taylor's suit because he was not "main-
28 
taining his athle~ic eligibility ••• both physically and scholasticallyo" 
(9) 
Therefore, he was unable to receive damages since he "was not complying with his 
29 
contractual agreement." 
In addition to the contractual rel~tionship within the business perspective, 
there are many who feel that college athletics have taken on an overtly professional 
perspective. They see university athletic departments as not only businesses, but 
as profession~! sports entities. 
Allen Sack is a Professor of Sociology at the University of New Haven. In ad-
clition to his duties as an educator, Sack is Executive Director of the Center for 
Athlete's Rights and Education (CARE). He sums up this professional/business per-
spective in this statement: "Ninety per cent of the problems that we have in col-
lege sports today are related to the fact that we are imposing an amateur label on 
\'l.r-'o-
what is obviously an overt mass commercial entertainment business." 
When asked to the respond to the decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana in 
the Rensing case, Prof. Sack said, "I see the Rensing decision as a major setback 
for athletes' rights." 
i'\c~ 
However, not all courts are unable to break from the traditonal perspective. 
In fact, a Minnesota Court in two separate cases, a decade apart, has made these re-
marks about college ahtletics quite in line with the professional/business perspec-
30 
tive. In Behagen v Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, the 
Court observed that: 
"In these days when juniors in college are able to suspend their formal 
educational training in exchange for multi-million dollar contracts to 
turn professional, this Court takes judicial note of the fact that to 
many, the chance to display their athletic prowess in college stadiums 
and arena throughout the country is more in economic terms than the 
chance to get a college education." 
32 
31 
Then, in ~ v University of Minnesota, the Court declared that: 
"The bachelor of arts, while a mark of achievement and distinction, does 
-------------------------- ---------------------------
(10) 
not in and of itself assure the applicant a means of earning a living. 
• • • His basketball career will be little affected by the absence 
or presence of a bachelor of arts degree. This plaintiff has put all 
of his 'eggs' into the 'basket' of professional basketballo The plain-
tiff would suffer a substantial loss if his career objectives were im-
33 
paired." 
What is significant about these remarks, although the cases were not involved 
with workmen's compensation specifically, is that the Courts are willing to look at 
disputes involving collegiate athletes and the institution from the perspective that 
participation in intercollegiate athletics has many professional and business oriented 
characteristics. Also of importance is the fact that the judiciary, like the edu-
cators and sports participants, is split between the two perspectives on college 
athletics. 
As a result of the two substantially opposing perspectives on college athletics, 
it will be up to the courts to settle the disputes. However, before the judicial 
branch can come to grips with this problem, it must decide which perspective it is 
to use in order to consistently characterize the relationship between a scholarship 
athlete and the university. Only then will the Courts be able to resolve the issue 
of whether an employer-employee relationship exists between an institution and the 
scholarship athlete under the laws of workmen's compensation. 
THE GRANTING OF SCHOLARSHIPS AND THE EMPLOYER-EHPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP: 
The key question in this area is whether a financial aid agreement between a 
student-athlete and an educational institution establishes an employer-employee 
relationship. Such a relationship is required for an injured scholarship athlete 
to be eligible to receive benefits under workmen's compensation. 
In other words, "workmen's compensation benefits in most jurisdictions are 
available to 'employees', so that a claimant must prove that he or she is an em-
(11) 
ployee, and not an independent contractor, or person of other status, who is 
34 
excluded from coverage." As a result, the Courts are faced with analyzing 
whether the injured scholarship athlete proves his or her employment. 
In the Rensing case, the analysis of the lower Court was that the athlete 
sufficiently proved that he "and the Trustees bargained for an exchange in the 
manner of employer and employee of Rensing's football talents for certain schol-
35 
arship benefits." However, the State Supreme Court overruled the lower Court 
on the grounds that, "the appellant shall be considered only as a student-athlete 
36 
and not as an employee within the meaning of the Horkmen's Compensation Act." 
Justice Hunter noted three reasons why an employer-employee relationship 
did not exist in the Rensing case: 1) "There was no intent to enter into an 
employee-employer relationship at the time the parties entered into the agree-
37 
ment." ; 2) "Rensing did not receive 'pay' for playing football at the Univer-
38 
sity within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act." ; 3) "Rensing's 
benefits could not be reduced or withdrawn because of his athletic ability or 
his contribution to the team's success. Thus, the ordinary employer's right 
39 
to discharge on the basis of performance was also missing." 
Although the State Supreme Court's decision is persuasively written, there 
are many, like Prof. Waicukauski, who feel that "the decision is subject to 
some criticism." Likewise, author Harry M. Cross notes that "even when the 
institution takes steps to insure that its academic interests in its student-
athletes is not perverted, critics will raise the issue of whether the athlete 
40 
is not more appropriately regarded as an employee of the school." It is, 
therefore, important to note the critics' rebuttals to the three reasons the 
Supreme Court of Indiana denied Rensing his claim for workmen's compensation. 
* * * 
With regard to the intent behind the award of financial aid in college 
athletics, the following Court opinion is of note: "The motivation behind [the] 
(12) 
aid is • •• at least sometimes, an effort to induce a good athlete to attend 
' 41 
a particular school in order to be of assistance to the athletic program." 
Indeed, many scholarship athletes feel that the University intended for 
them to come to their school for the express purpose of assisting their inter-
collegiate teams much like an employer hires someone to assist in the operation 
of their business. Abrams says that, "the main reason Indiana sought me was for 
my football playing abilities. I can't think of any other reason why the Uni-
versity wanted me. 11 Likewise, Ron Everhart feels that he was recruited to play 
basketball at Virginia Tech in a similar manner that corporations recruit pos-
sible employees. He feels that, "at a major college, sports is a business, not 
merely a game. As a result, the players on scholarship are like employees, not 
merely student-athletes." 
Therefore, it is important to realize that while the University Trustees 
and administrators might argue that they do not intend to enter into an employ-
ment relationship, the reality of the situation is that the scholarship athletes 
often feel that they have indeed entered into one. As Prof. Sack puts it, "How 
can you have a business without employees? Sure they are student-athletes; but 
are they not employees also?" 
* * * 
The second area in which the critics disagree with Justice Hunter's opin-
ion, is the question of "pay." They feel that the benefits derived from an 
athletic scholarship are similar to other forms of remuneration which are pro-
tected under workmen's compensation. 
Prof. Haicukauski says that, "the decision based on pay is not fairly re-
flective of prior decisions which do establish that when you give benefits (and 
in this case we are talking about benefits worth $2000- $3000), regardless of 
whether you give cash or in some other form such as room, board, tuition and 
k that Constitutes pay." boo s • • • 
(13) 
Although the NCAA does not regard financial aid or any other author-
ized expense as pay, "athletically-related financial aid is viewed by some as 
42 
mere 'pay', and the recipient, therefore, is an employee." Everhart feels 
that, "I'm getting paid to play basketball with my scholarship. However, it's 
not nearly enough compensation for what scholarship athletes have to go through." 
Numerous other scholar-athletes feel the same way, although many do not go 
as far as to claim they are being undercompensated. Andrew Reher, scholarship 
basketball player at the University of Richmond, believes that, "I am a profes-
sional athlete by virtue of the fact that I am being 'paid' over $8000 a year 
(the value of a full scholarship at Richmond) for putting in 25-30 hours a week 
on behalf of the Spider basketball program. In other words, my education is 
being 'paid' for while I, at least indirectly, help the school make money off 
of the sale of basketball tickets and alumni contributions to the athletic de-
f~b_ 
partment." 
If financial aid is to be viewed as "pay", can it be brought within the 
umbrella of benefits protected by workmen's compensation? 
Although the State Supreme Court overruled the lower Court's decision in 
Rensing, it is important to note the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Pre-
siding Judge Miller noted that "any benefit, commonly the subject of pecuniary 
compensation, which one, not intending it as a gift, confers on another, who 
accepts it, is adequate foundation for a legally i~plied or created promise to 
43 
render back its value." Prof. tfuicukauski agrees with this line of reason-
ing. He says that "for purposes of the Indiana Horkmen's Compensation Laws, 
these benefits are almost consistently regarded as pay." 
* * * 
The third reason the Court gave in deciding that an employment relation-
ship did not exist in Rensing, was that the institution did not have the ordi-
nary employer's right to discharge an employee on the basis of poor performance. 
(14) 
Abrams agrees with the State Supreme Court in this part of the decision. He 
did not see himself completely as being an employee because "the University 
could not take away my scholarship for poor performance. That is simply a key 
factor in determining whether a person is an employee." 
However, many people associated with college athletics feel quite differ-
ently. Prof. Waicukauski thinks that the Rensing decision "disregards the re-
ality of the relationship established between a student-athlete and an institu-
tion." In agreement is Prof. Sack. He believes that "athletes are expected to 
take on all of the responsibilities of a professional athlete - practice, travel, 
adhere to the coach's policies, etc. If a college athlete refuses to follow the 
coach's policies, he is in effect fired." 
These men are basing their opinions on the NCAA's practice of renewing fi-
nancial aid after each year of participation. Therefore, Prof. Waicukauski does 
not think that "there is any question that under NCAA rules, the employer -
44 
Indiana State University- could in fact fail to renew for no performance." 
Or, as Prof. Sack remarks: 
"What if an athlete does not perform up to expectations? The coach 
can take away his financial aid. The NCAA says, 'No he can't. They 
f&i0.-
can't away his aid for one year.' I see that as the grossest of 
hypocr~cies. Since they can take away the kid's aid after one year, 
that amounts to the school's ability to take the kid's aid." 
J\{t)\ii 
As Executive Director of CARE, Prof. Sack says he regularly receives calls 
from college athletes whose scholarships have been revoked for various reasons. 
One student from the University of ~Iassachusetts claimed that he lost his aid 
because of poor performance. Sack says that the ruling from the athletic com-
mittee stated that, "he was not a basketball player of sufficient caliber to 
play intercollegiate basketball for the University of Massachusetts." Sack, 
therefore, contends that "in this case, financial aid was contingent upon ath-
(15) 
letic performance. When the athlete fan~d to meet the employer's expectations, 
he was fired." 
* * * 
The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded in Rensing that, "[s]ince at least 
three important factors indicative of an employee-employer relationship are 
absent in this case, we find it not necessary to consider other factors which 
"15 
may or may not be present." It is important, however, to briefly mention these 
other factors. 
John N. Shanks, II, is a member of the Industrial Board of Indiana. How-
ever, he was not a member of the Industrial Board when it rejected Rensing's 
claim for compensation. In fact, he believes he would have dissented with his 
colleagues' rejection. Irregardless, Shanks reveals that when the Industrial 
Board is faced with a claim for compensation, "there are eight areas that we 
look to in determining if there is an employment relationship between the parties: 
1) Right to discharge the employee for performance 
2) The mode of payment 
3) Supplying tools and equipment 
4) Belief of the parties in an employer-employee relationship 
5) Control over the means used and the results reached 
6) Length of the employment 
7) Establishment of work boundaries 
8) Needs to a contract, either written or implied" 
As noted earlier, Justice Hunter only noted that the first, second and 
fourth factors are missing in the Rensing case. Likewise, logical rebuttals 
to his reasoning have been noted. Therefore, it is important to analyze the 
other factors necessary in an employment relationship in order to determine if 
in fact scholarship athletes are employees of the institution. 
The Fourth District Court of Appeals emphasized that it must "determine 
(16) 
whether [Rensing's] employment by the Trustees was 'casual and not in the usual 
course of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the employer' so as 
45o. 
to bring it outside the coverage of the statute." 
Shanks says that the reason he disagrees with the Industrial Board's de-
cision is that he agrees with the "Court of Appeals decision that the employment 
was not a casual employment." Indeed, the lower Court stated that, "it is ap-
parent that Rensing's employment was not casual, since it clearly was 'periodi-
cally regular', although not permanent. The uncontradicted evidence revealed 
that for the team members, football is a daily routine for 16 weeks each year." 
The opinion further noted the expected participation by scholarship athletes in 
daily "off-season" workouts. In addition, Rensing's participation at all at 
Indiana State was the result of Coach Thomas Harp's recruitng him to play for 
'v 
the school. "In light of these facts, Rensing's employment by the University 
47 
was not 'casual'." Coupling these remarks with the fact that the State Su-
46 
preme Court chose to remain silent on this area, it is safe to conclude that the 
sixth factor of employment is met in the athlete-institution relationship. 
Prof. Waicukauski discusses another one of the factors in determining an 
employment relationship: 
"The primary factor, historically, under workmen's compensation law 
for determining whether an employment relationship exists, is how 
much control does the employer exert over the employee. • • I think 
when you are talking about the relationship between an athlete and 
a coach in intercollegiate athletics, there is a 'heck-of-a-lot' of 
control." 
With regard to the need to a contract, the Trustees all along conceeded that 
48 
some manner of a contract existed between them and Rensing. However, they 
contend that there was no contract for hire or employment. Nonetheless, the 
lower Court sided with Rensing since the financial aid agreement he signed with 
(17) 
the school contained the following stipulation: "In the event that you incur 
an injury • • • Indiana State University will ask you to assist in the conduct 
49 
of the athletic program within the limits of your physical capabilities." 
The biggest criticism of the Rensing decision is that many people feel 
that the Court should have acknowledged a contract for hire because of the Uni-
versity adding this stipulation to the normal financial aid agreement. They 
contend that since he could have been required to perform services for the ath-
letic department above and beyond normal participation in practices and games, 
he was an employee for hire. 
What complicates matters is that most institutions' financial aid agree-
ments do not carry such stipulations for extra assistance on behalf of the ath-
letic department. As a result, many follow the line of reasoning set forth in 
State Compensation Insurance Fund v Industrial Commission: An athletic schol-
50 
arship without further terms does not constitute a contract for hire. 
The remaining two conditions of employment - supplying tools and equipment 
and establishment of work boundaries - were not addressed by either of the two 
Courts in Rensing. Many feel that these are the two least important of the 
eight conditions of employment. Nonetheless, one can argue that by including 
books and athletic equipment in the normal grant-in-aid, that condition is met. 
Likewise, one can argue that coaches normally set some types of work boundart~s-
for tAe players to follow. 
* * * 
In summary, the debate over whether an employment relationship exists in 
college athletics as a result of the signing of a financial aid agreement is 
far from over. Obviously, it will be the role of the Courts to attempt to set-
tle the dispute. As was mentioned in the last section, the Courts must first 
-~j 
decide which perspective to be used· in order to consistently characterize 
whther an employer-employee relationship exists between a scholarship athlete 
(18) 
and the institution. Similarly, the Courts must establish a consistent appli-
cation of the eight factors or conditions in determining whether this employ-
ment relationship exists. Only then will the Courts be able to resolve the issue 
of workmeris compensation for injured scholarship athletes. 
THE INJURED SCHOLARSHIP ATHLETE AND WORKMEN'S COMP~SATION: 
With regard to professional athletics, the Courts have stated that work-
men's compensation laws not only apply to industrial accidents, but are "broad 
51 
enough to include within its coverage employees engaged in athletic business." 
52 
In Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company of New York v Huhn, the Court de-
cided that, "the baseball player who was killed [in a car accident on the way 
to a game] was a person in the service of another under contract of hire, and 
53 
therefore was an employee." 
The question now before the Courts, then, is whether the financial aid 
agreement between the student-athlete and the institution constitutes a contract 
for hire within the broad range of accidents and injuries covered under work-
men's compensation. As noted by Cym H. Lowell in The Law of Sports, "the most 
complex problem involved in the area of workmen's compensation liability for 
athletic injuries, is the extent to which college or university athletes may 
54 
recover for their participation related injuries." 
In analyzing this problem, the Court of Appeals reasoned in Rensing that: 
"the central question is not whether our Legislature has specifically 
excluded college sports participants from the coverage of the Act, 
since it is apparent the Legislature has not expressed such an in-
tention, but rather whether there was a 'written or implied' employ-
ment contract within the meaning of the Act which obligated Rensing 
55 
to play football in return for the scholarship he received." 
(19) 
As noted, the lower Court decided that there was indeed a contract for 
hire between Rensing and the University. Consequently, that Court remanded the 
case back to the Industrial Board for further proceedings to establish the extent 
of the benefits he would receive. 
However, the Supreme Court of Indiana took jurisdiction and overruled the 
Fourth Dictrict Court's decision. Justice Hunter's emphasized that "Courts in 
other jurisdictions have generally found that such individuals as stu'aent-athletes, 
student leaders in student government associations, and student resident-hall 
assistants are not 'employees' for purpose of workmen's compensation laws unless 
they are also employed in a university job in addition to receiving-scholarship 
56 
benefits." 
Nonetheless, the stipulation in Rensing's financial aid agreement with the 
University made clear the possibility that if he were ever injured, he would be 
asked to perform other jobs for the athletic department. As Harry Pratter, Di-
rector of the Center for Law and Sports at Indiana University School of Law, 
says, "the [Rensing] case is a very sad result. There was a perfectly clear 
reason for including him under workmen's compensation without having to extend 
the coverage to all athletes. Since he could have been required to perform ser-
vices for the athletic department he was an employee and entitled to work-
men's compensation." 
\,\\~ 
Due to the Rensing decision, it is safe to say that the issue of workmen's 
compensation has been resolved in Indiana. However, as Prof. Waicukauski says, 
"there is still a great deal of potential for further litigation in this area." 
In fact, there are similar cases pending in Illinois and Florida. 
As a result, this question still remains to be answered by the Courts. Will 
the judiciary continue to be relatively inconsistent in its case by case inter-
pretations of the Workmen's Compensation Laws with regard to injured scholarship 
athletes? As Lowell has written, "it cannot be said that the Court's conclusions 
-------------------------------------
(20) 
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or reasoning provide a consistent view of the athlete-institution relationship." 
Or, will a consistent interpretation of the eight factors or conditions of 
employment be applied by the Courts in determining whether an injured scholarship 
athlete is eligible for workmen's compensation? It is the opinion of most that 
the Courts are a long way from resolving this issue unless the United States Su-
preme Court decides to hear a case in this area. 
Sheldon F. Steinbach, author of "Workmen's Compensation and the Scholarship 
Athlete", sums up this present state of affairs with regard to this issue in the 
following statement: 
"The schools must eliminate any contractual relationship which provides 
for the rewarding or renewal of scholarship aid only so long as the stu-
dent plays on the team. • • • Should institutions of higher education 
persist in retaining a contractual employment relationship with their 
scholarship athletes, whereby financial aid is only dispersed as long 
as the student is a participating team member, it is only just that 
the student is protected and receive the benefits under Workmen's Com-
58 
pensation for any injuries sustained while employed by his school." 
IN HY OPINION: 
When I was a senior basketball player at DeMatha Catholic High School in 
Hyattsville, Maryland, I viewed the world of college athletics from the traditional 
persective. To me, an athletic scholarship was nothing more than a vehicle for 
defraying the cost of a college education. After all, wasn't athletics going to 
be just a mere part of my overall educational experience? 
Now that I have had the opportunity to participate for the past three years in 
a major college athletic program, I have come to see how naive my original per-
spectives were. Although the NCAA claims that athletes are students, first and 
(21) 
foremost, that simply is not the case a vast majority of the time. The reason 
for this is simple: Intercollegiate athletic programs are big businesses. 
While I still view athletics as a means to receiving my degree from the Uni-
versity of Richmond, I can not help but feel that my scholarship represents a 
contractual agreement. In exchange for paying for my education, I am expected 
to perform to the fullest of my abilities on behalf of the basketball program at 
Richmond. As a result of this contract, I feel like the University is giving me 
over $8000 a year for room, board, tuition and books while I help them in putting 
paying customers into the stands and hopefully ~ncrese their athletic endowmen~ 
Likewise, I have grown to believe that when an athlete signs a financial aid 
agreement with an institution, the parties take on an employment realtionship. 
Therefore, I disagree with the Supreme Court of Indiana's decision in Rensing v 
Indiana State University Board of Trustees, supra. 
Without a doubt, the University of Richmond recruited me for the express 
purpose of helping their basketball team. Virtually from the first day of prac-
tice, I have felt that I am much more than just a student-athlete on campus. In 
addition, I have felt like an employee of the athletic department which is not only 
in the business of producing winning teams, but is in the business of making money. 
I also feel that like any other employee, I am being remunerated for my ser-
vices. I agree with the statements of Richmond assistant basketball coach Joe 
Gallagher: 
"An employer-employee relationship does exist between the players and 
the college because the school asks the kids to perform in an athletic capacity 
in return for an education. Now, although the school does not pay the players 
in terms of cold, hard cash~they are being paid in the form of a $40,000 edu-
cation for their performance. To me, that is just like a job. The only differ-
ence is that the athlete doesn't get his 'pay' in the form of a weekly cheque."~ 
Lastly, I feel that scholarship athletes do have to perform up to their QR-
(22) 
employer's expectations or they can have their scholarships revoked. As Gal-
lagher points out, "Schools have the ability to terminate a player's financial 
aid after one year. In fact, I know of a number of schools who have 'run players· 
out' of their programs because they made mistakes in projecting that the players 
fu~ 
could participate for them." 
Nonetheless, I think it is important to note that these instances of "run-
ning players out" of their programs are infrequent. Most schools adhere to the 
coaching philosophy that Gallagher espouses: "If the staff makes a mistake in 
signing a below adequate player, it is the responsibility of the coaches to live 
'IJi:t" 
up to their end of the financial agreement."' 
Therefore, I wholeheartedly disagree with the three reasons given by Justice 
Hunter in denying Rensing workmen's compensation. Although the NCAA may not label 
it this way, the reality of the situation is that college athletes are signed by 
I 
a school with the intent of helping its athletic program. As a result, they are 
"paid" for their participation. Finally, they can (although I feel that it is 
rare) be "fired" for poor performance. 
With regard to workmen's compensation, I believe that the prerequisite con-
tract for hire is established through the financial aid agreeMent •. As a result, 
I feel that if an athlete is injured while participating in college athletics, 
he should be compensated. 
As Abrams says, "the University has the obligation to see that the athlete 
is 'made whole' following an injury." However, Abrams does make the accurate as-
c;ertion that, "usually the parties are able to work out a settlement compensating 
['lc~ 
the injured athlete." 
Indeed, from personal experience I can attest to the fact that most of the 
time< the employer sees to it that the athlete is fairly compensated without re-
quiring a filing of workmen's compensation. During my freshman season, I suf-
fered an illness which prevents me from playing intercollegiate basketball. I 
(23) 
am fortunate that the University of Richmond, like most schools, paid all of my 
medical bills. In addition, the institution has renewed my scholarship as an 
undergraduate assistant coach. l ~t'w 'Jll\!l~ c~ eX~-~ /1..-4f'N\. cuu~~ J)..;w,,.:\c"' ~ ~ ~ ·"'"' 
,r () _ 1 7'. 
;)c.; VV)VV' '\) "l - } 
Nonetheless, not all schools are as ethical. As a result, I agree with 
Shanks. When discussing the Rensing decision, he says, "I am not pleased. There 
has to be an alternative. There has to be something to, as I perceive it, take 
care of a very tragic situation." ~~ 
The obvious alternative is to bring scholarship athletes within the bounds 
of workmen's compensation. If the Courts develop a consistent interpretation 
that the athlete-in~titution relationship does conform to the eight factors of 
employment, injured athletes should be assured that they will be compensated. 
However, the litigation is not the only area which is involved in the de-
bate over the employment relationship in college athletics and how that applies 
to the Laws of Workmen's Compensation. For as so often happens in the sports tri-
angle which is increasingly enveloping American athletics, the ~egislatures are 
making it their business to get involved. 
One example of this is the recent bill sponsored by Sen. Ernest Chambers 
of Omaha, Nebraska. He has introduced a bill in the Nebraska Legislature that 
would classify University of Nebraska football players as state employees. Cham-
hers contends that, "the bill merely would legitimize existing 'under-the-table' 
incentives (cash, cars, clothes, and special privileges) to perform on the grid-
59 
iron." ~~ile this controversial bill will most likely expire in committee, it 
is noteworthy that the legislative branch is attempting to involve itself in 
the judicial and administrative problems of collegiate athletics. 
The NCAA has also taken action in this area. "The NCAA Insurance Committee 
has developed guidelines for a plan that would provide catastrophic injury in-
surance for NCAA member-institutions and their student-athletes. While it should 
be noted that such insurance coverage would not constitute an acknowledgement 
(24) 
of any employer-employee relationship", it is noteworthy that the NCAA is re-
sponding to public concern and criticism over the handling of such injuries as 
incurred by Rensing. 
In summary, I want to end this chapter on "Scholarship Athletes and the Uni-
versity: An E~loyer-Employee Relationship?", with the closing remarks from Allen 
iJ 
Sack's presentation at the "Law and Amateur Sports II" seminar. He makes a very 
persuasive arguement from the perspective that college sports is a business in 
which the scholarship athlete is an employee deserving of workmen's compensation: 
"When it comes to responsibilities, universities and the Courts do not 
hesitate. to define athletes as employees under contract. Like profes-
sionals, scholarship athletes must sacrifice time, effort and control 
over their bodies in return for financial compensation. In the pro-
cess of meeting their contractual obligations, athletes make themselves 
vulnerable to physical and academic abuse. Unlike professional ath-
letes, however, scholarship athletes are denied a wide range of rights 
and protections that are often taken for granted by other American em-
ployees. Therefore, when it comes to responsibilities, Universities 
should be made to act like employers. Yet when it comes to rights, 
athletes are magically transformed into rank amateurs. This is not 
only hypocritical, it's dangerous and exploitive. 
"There are reasons for workmen's compensation laws in this coun-
try. The reasons are that you are putting yourself into a jeopardized 
situation when you go into an employment situation. Therefore, you 
should be protected by some sort of workmen's compensation. 
"The financial exploitation that results from workers being de-
fined as amateurs is obvious. Scholarship athletes help to generate 
millions of dollars in revenues for their Universities. Yet by in-
sisting that these athletes are mere amateurs, the Universities can 
l 
(25) 
pay a minimum of room, board, tuition and books. ( 
\\;~ 
shrewd way of cutting costs, but it is exploitive, nonetheless." ,,v 
This may be a 
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APPENDIX "A" 
BIG TEN CONFERENCE 
TENDER OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
1981-82 
VOID f-rom: _______ _ 
Date 
tNome ol Univo"otyo 
0 Initial 0 Renewal To:----------------~---~-----------------
tNome of Appllcontl Dote of Entrance in 
University ____ _ 
!Street Address! Sport _____ _ 
--- -·-·---tCify ond Stotet College Per~od ____ _ 
I. This Tender is subject to your fulfillment of the admission requirement~ of this University, and its oca· 
demic requirements for athletic competition and finonc iol aid. 
2. This Tender covers the following as checked: 
--(a I Full Grant: includes tuition and fees, room and board, and use of necessary books in your selected 
course of study. 
-- lbl The following items as checked: 
--( 11 Tuition and fees in your selected course of study 
__ (21 Boord 
__ (31 Room 
- (4} Use of necessary books in your selected course of study 
--<51 Other explanation of award: 
ACCEPTANCE 
I accept this Tender of Financial Assistance. In doing so, I certify that I hove not accepted any other Tender of 
Financial Assistance from a Big Ten Conference member at any time. 
I understand that: 
Ia I 
(IJ) 
I c l 
( cJ) 
lcl 
(f) 
I will forfeit my athletic elig1bility if I rece1ve any financial assistance from any source other than as 
provided for in this award, or my family or governmental agencies, or in the form of on award 
having nothing whatsoever to do with my athletic abilities or interest~. 
Any employment earnings by me during term time and any other financial assistance, except from my 
family, but including academic scholarships, must be reported by me to the Conference Commissioner 
on forms he will provide. Any such earnings or assistance, in combination with the aid provided 
through this Tender, may not exceed NCAA basic educational costs ot my University. 
The value of this Tender, together with a BEOG, and any employment earnings or other university admin-
istered financial aid, shall not exceed the value of a full Tender plus the permissible miscellaneous 
expenses approved by the US Office of Education in administering the BEOG program. 
The aid provided in this Tender will be cancelled if I :;ign a profe:;s1onol ~port~ cuntract or accept money 
for playing in an athletic contest. 
This Tender may not be signed prior to Novcmb'.!r 1, 1980 for basketball, or prior to Feburary 18, 1981 
for football, or prior to March 1, 1981 for all other sports. 
After accepting this Tender, I may not thereafter receive from any other Conference member any form 
of financial assistance based upon my athletic ability or through the intervention of athletic interests 
without forfeiting my intercollegiate athletic eligibility at the other university. 
Signed .. ---------------------------· 
Student Doto ond Social Security Number 
~-:gncd-- ------Pore-;.,! <:>r Lq)ol Guordool"' ------- .. ·-----·. Dote 
--j(~~~~ish-t~cccpt thi;'_T-;,-nder .of-~lnancial As~~tance, sign all copies. Kce_p_th_e_o-ri-g-in_o_l -,-op-y_f_o_r_y_o_u_r_f_i_le-!> 
nd rdurn the yellow and p1nk cop1cs 1mmedlately upon signature to: 
STUDENT'S FILE CCPY 
I ~I 
APPENDIX "B" 
1983 MEN'S NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT 1983 
(Administered by the Collegiate Commissioners Association) 
0 FOOTBALL, MID·YEAR JUNIOR COLLEGE TRANSFER: Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. 
December 15, 1982 and no later than January 15, 1983 
0 FOOTBALL: Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. February 9, 1983 and no later 
than May 1, 1983 
0 BASKETBALL: Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. November 10, 1982 and no later 
than November 17, 1982 OR do not sign prior to 8:00 a.m. April 
13, 1983 and no later than May 15, 1983 ._ 
0 ALL OTHER SPORTS: Do not sign prior to 8:00a.m. April13, 1983 and no later than 
(Place "X"ln proper bo:r above} August 1, 1983 
Nameofstudent --------------------~~~~UL~~~~~--~~~--------------------­(Type proper name, includtng middle name or initial) 
Address ______________ ~~~~-------------------------------~~--=-~-------------
street Number City, Stale, Zip Code 
This is to certify my decision to enroll at 
Name of Institution 
IMPORTANT· READ CAREFULLY 
It is important to read carefully this entire document, including the reverse side, before signing this Let· 
ter in triplicate. One copy is to be retained by you and two copies are to be returned to the institution, one 
of which will be sent to the appropriate conference commissioner. 
1. By signing this Letter, I understand that if I enroll in another institution participating in the National Letter of 
Intent Program, I may not represent that institution in intercollegiate athletic competition until I have been in 
residence at that institution for two calendar years and in no case will I be eligible for more than two seasons 
of intercollegiate competition in any sport. 
However, these restrictions will not apply to me: 
(a) If I have not, by the opening day of its classes in the fall of 1983 (or the opening day of its classes of the 
winter or spring term of 1983 for a mid-year junior college entrant in the sport of football), met the re-
quirements for admission to the institution named above, its academic requirements for financial aid to 
athletes, the NCAA 2.000 GPA requirement, and the junior college transfer rule; or 
(b) If I attend the institution named above for at least one academic year; or 
(c) If I graduate from junior college after having signed a National Letter of Intent while in high school or dur· 
ing my first year in junior college; or 
(d) It I have not attended any institution (or attended an institution, including a junior college, which does not 
participate in the National Letter of Intent Program) for the next academic year after signing this Letter, 
provided my request for the originally specified financial aid for the following fall term is not approved by 
the institution with which I signed. In order to receive this waiver, I must file with the appropriate con-
ference commissioner a statement from the Director of Athletics at the institution with which I signed cer· 
tifying that such financial aid will not be available to me for the requested fall term; or 
(e) If 1 serve on active duty with the armed forces of the United States or on an official church mission for at 
least eighteen (18) months; or 
(f) If my sport is discontinued by the institution with which I signed this Letter. 
2. 1 understand that THIS IS NOT AN AWARD OF FINANCIAL AID. If my enrollment decision is made with the 
understanding that 1 will receive financial aid, I should have in my possession before signing this Letter a writ· 
ten statement from the institution which lists the terms and conditions, including the amount and duration, of 
such financial aid. 
······-············-----------···-----···---·----······-·····-···--------------···--············-··-··-·-······-.................................................................................................................................... . 
1 certify that I have read all terms and. condi!io~s. on pages 1 ~nd 2, fully unders~and, accept and agree to be bound 
by them. (All three copies must be s1gned mdJVJdually for thiS Letter to be valid. Do not use carbons). 
SIGN ED -----------------=s,....ru...,.de-n.,...r --------------
SIGNED ------=----:---:-----,-;::--::------Parent or Legal Guardtan 
Submission of this Letter has been authorized by: 
SIGNED --------~D~,e~cr~or~o71A~th~te=r,~cs~---------
. 1 . 
Dare & Time Social Securily Number 
Date Trme 
Date Issued to Student Sport 
NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT 
REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES 
3. I MAY SIGN ONLY ONE VALID NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT. However, if this Letter Is rendered null and 
void under item 1 ·(a) on page 1, I remain free to enroll in any institution of my choice where I am admissible 
and shall be permitted to sign another Letter in a subsequent signing year. 
4. I understand that I have signed this Letter with the Institution and not tor a particular sport. 
5. I understand that all participating conferences and institutions (listed below) are obligated to respect my deci· 
sion and shall cease to recruit me once I have signed this Letter. . 
6. If my parent or legal guardian fails to cosign this Letter, it will be invalid. In that event, this Letter may be 
reissued. 
7. My signature on this Letter nullifies any agreements, oral or otherwise, which would release me from the con-
ditions stated on this Letter. 
8. This letter must be signed and dated by the Director of Athletics or his authorized representative before sub-
mission to me and my parent or legal guardian for our signatures. 
9. I must sign this letter within 14 days after it has been issued to me or it will be invalid. In that event, this letter 
may be reissued. (Note: Exception is November 10·17, 1982, signing period for basketball). 
10. This Letter must be filed with the appropriate conference by the institution with which I sign within 21 days 
after the date of final signature or it will be invalid. In that event, this Letter may be reissued. 
11. If I have knowledge that I or my parentllegat guardian have falsified any part of this letter, I understand that I 
shall forfeit the first two years of my eligibility at the participating institution in which I enroll as outlined in 
item 1. 
12. A release procedure shall be provided in the event the student·athlete and the institution mutually agree to 
release each other from any obligations of the Letter. A student·athlete receiving a format release shall not be 
eligible for practice and competition at the second institution during the first academic year of residence and 
shall have no more than three seasons of eligibility remaining. The form must be signed by the student-
athlete, his parent or legal guardian, and the Director of Athletics at the institution with which he signed. A 
copy of the release must be filed with the conference which processes the Letters of the signing institution. 
The following Conferences and Institutions have subscribed to and are cooperating in the National Letter of In-
tent Plan administered by the Collegiate Commissioners Association: 
Atlantic Coast 
Big East 
Big Eight 
Big Sky 
Big Ten 
California Collegiate 
Central Intercollegiate 
Lone Star 
Alabama State 
Arkansas-Pine Bluff 
Augusta 
Baptist 
Bellarmine 
Boston College 
Brooklyn 
Campbell 
Canisius 
Central Florida 
Central State (Ohio) 
Charleston 
Chicago State 
Connecticut 
Dayton 
Delta State 
DePaul 
Duquesne 
East Carolina 
Eastern Montana 
Fairfield 
Ferris State 
CONFERENCES 
Metropolitan 
Mid-American 
Mid-Continent 
Mid-Eastern 
Midwestern City 
Missouri Valley 
Missouri Intercollegiate 
North Central 
Ohio Valley 
Pacific Coast 
Pacific-10 
Southeastern 
Southern 
Southern Intercollegiate 
Southland 
INSTITUTIONS 
Florida International 
Florida Southern 
Fordham 
Gannon 
George Mason 
George Washington 
Georgetown 
Georgia State 
Grand Valley 
Hofstra 
Indiana State-Evansville 
lena 
James Madison 
Kentucky Wesleyan 
Lake Superior 
Liberty Baptist 
Maine (Orono) 
Maris! 
Marquette 
Miami (Florida) 
Michigan Tech 
Minnesota-Duluth 
New Hampshire 
New Orleans 
Niagara 
Nicholls State 
North Carolina-Wilmington 
Northern Kentucky 
Northern Michigan 
Northwood Institute 
Notre Dame 
Oakland 
Pan American 
Penn State 
Philadelphia Textiles 
Pittsburgh 
Providence 
Randolph-Macon 
Rhode Island 
Richmond 
Robert Morris 
Rollins 
Rutgers 
St. Bonaventure 
. 2. 
Southwest 
Southwestern 
Sun Belt 
Trans-America 
West Coast 
Western 
Western Football 
St. Francis (Pa.) 
Saint Leo 
Slippery Rock 
South Carolina 
Southeastern Louisiana 
Southern Illinois-Edwardsville 
Southwestern Louisiana 
Stetson 
Syracuse 
Tampa 
Temple 
Tennessee State 
Texas-San Antonio 
Transylvania 
Troy State 
Utica 
Valdosta State 
Vermont 
Wayne State 
West Virginia 
William and Mary 
Wright State 
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(34) 
INTRODUCTION: 
1 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act. In it, restraint 
of trade or commerce as well as monopolizing any part of the trade 
2 
or commerce among the several states was declared illegal. Twenty-
four years later, Congress passed another major piece of antitrust 
3 
legislation, the Clayton Act. It provided a treble damage remedy 
and injunctive relief for Sherman Act violations. 
Basically, the Sherman and Clayton Acts "prohibit business 
competitors from engaging in any activities which would inhibit the 
operation of a free enterprise system and consequently impair the 
4 
nation's overall economic health and stability." At the time of 
their enactment, professional sports were understandably exempt since 
their economic impact was quite minimal. During this period, antitrust 
5 
laws were best applied to the more highly developed industries. 
However, as professional athletics expanded and prospered, the 
federal government accordingly applied the antitrust laws to their 
activities. Remarkably, though, baseball has enjoyed the distinction 
of being one of the very few major interstate businesses - and the only 
professional sport - to be exempt from federal antitrust sanctions. 
This chapter analyzes how professional baseball was accorded and 
maintains its anomalous antitrust exemption. This distinct status 
is examined from five perspectives: the judicial creation of the 
anomaly; criticisms of the judiciary; Congressional silence; non-
judicial and non-legislative solutions; and baseball's opposing view-
points. 
I 
______ j 
(35) 
While reading this chapter, keep in mind the overall theme 
of this book: the existence of a "sports triangle." Put simply, 
professional baseball has been fundamentally influenced by the 
judicial creation of an exemption from federal legislation. In 
addition, the "triangle" has taken on unique dimensions with regard 
to the antitrust laws in that the judiciary refuses to judge, the 
legislators refuse to legislate, and yet solutions to the problem 
have been remedied by those within the sport. 
Section 2.1 The Judicial Creation of the Anomaly 
I. Federal Baseball and Toalson 
As early as 1914, the judiciary was faced vdth resolving the 
6 
status of baseball in conjunction with federal antitrust legislation. 
However, it was not until 1922 that the Supreme Court agreed to address 
7 
the issue in the landmark case, Federal Baseball v. National League. 
In that case, seven clubs from the Federal League of Baseball 
were induced by the National League to join its organization. How-
ever, the Baltimore baseball club alleged that the National League 
had conspired to prevent the formation of a competitive league and 
was therefore in violation of the Sherman Acto It was further argued 
that the National League had destroyed the Federal League through its 
purchase of the latter's constituent teams. The plaintiffs felt that 
in addition to conspiring to form a monopoly in professional baseball, 
the antitrust provisions had been violated since the teams were located 
8 
among several states. 
(36) 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that although "the players were 
transported across state lines, this movement was only incidental 
to, and not an essential part of, a baseball game which was played 
9 
strictly within state boundaries." Instead of defining baseball 
in business terms, the Court emphasized that the "exhibitions of 
baseball did not engage in interstate commerce for the purposes of 
10 
the federal antitrust laws." 
In his opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes stated that: 
"the fact that, in order to give exhibitions, 
the League must induce free persons to cross 
state lines, and must arrange and pay for 
their doing so, is not enough to change the 
character of the business • • • ,·_T-~ he exhibi-
tion, although made for money, would not be 
called trade or commerce in the commonly 
11 
accepted use of those words." 
Since professional baseball was not involved in interstate 
commerce, it was therefore deemed exempt from federal antitrust 
laws. 
In the 20 to 30 years following the unanimous Court's decision 
in Federal Baseball, baseball changed significantly. Its business 
activities not only continued to involve interstate travel, but the 
advent of radio and television broadcasts carried the "exhibitions" 
all over the country. 
(37) 
The first notable challenge to the Court's reasoning in 
12 
Federal Baseball occurred in 1949. In Gardella v. Chandler, 
a three-judge panel was split over the antitrust issue. "Judges 
Learned Hand and Jerome Frank agreed that in view of the expanded 
concept of interstate commerce and the growth of organized baseball, 
the antitrust immunity conferred to Federal Baseball was perhaps no 
13 
longer valid." Judge Frank concluded that: 
"This court cannot, of course, tell the 
Supreme Court that it was once wrong. But 
one should not wait for formal retraction 
14 
in the face of charges plaining foreshadowed." 
An out of court settlement prevented Gardella from advancing 
to the Supreme Court. It was not until 1953 that another case 
challenging baseball's antitrust exemption reached the highest 
court. 
In Toalson v. New York Yankees, Inc. and its two companion 
15 
cases, "several baseball players challenged the reserve system 
alleging damage by the unlawful control of their freedom to participate 
16 17 
as players." The Court, in a per curiam decision , affirmed the 
lower court's decision upholding Federal Baseball since, "the business 
of providing public baseball games for profit 
18 
the scope of federal antitrust laws." 
• was not within 
Of equal importance is the judiciary's deference to legislative 
remedies for the exemption: 
"Congress has had the rulir..g under consider-
ation but has not seen fit to bring such 
business under these laws by legislation 
(38) 
having prospective effect. The business 
has thus been left for thirty years to 
develop, on the understanding that it was 
not subject to existing antitrust legislation. 
The present cases ask us to overrule the prior 
decision and, with retrospective effect, hold 
the legislation applicable. We think that if 
there are evils in this field which now 
warrant application to it of the antitrust 
19 
laws it should be by legislation." 
By relying solely on Federal Baseball and Congressional silence, 
the Supreme Court issued their ruling "without re-examination of the 
20 
underlying issues" of the case. Many scholars are critical of 
this because unlike Federal Baseball, "Toalson did not hold as is 
commonly thought that in 1953 baseball was still not to be considered 
21 
trade or commerce". This in fact was pronounced two years later 
22 
in United States v. Shubert. Nonetheless, the Court refused to rule 
23 
(in Toalson) on the alleged illegality of baseball's "reserve clause" 
until 1972. 
II. Antitrust and other professional soorts 
It was not until the late 1950's that baseball's exemption began 
to take on its anomalous characteristic. On the same day that it 
decided Shubert, the Court rejected the claim by the International 
24 
Boxing Club that Toalson should apply to all professional sports. 
(39) 
Of greater significance is the 1957 case, Radovich v. 
25 
National Football League. In the late 1940's, Radovich played 
for the Detroit Lions of the N.F.L. He broke his contract with 
the Lions in order to play in the upstart All-American Conference. 
As a result, the NFL declared him ineligible. Years later, he was 
turned down when he applied for the job as coach of the San Francisco 
Clippers of the Pacific Coast League because it was an affiliate 
of the NFL. Radovich sued for treble damages alleging that the 
NFL was in violation of federal antitrust laws. 
The Supreme Court formalized the anomaly by deciding that, 
"Since Toalson and Federal Baseball are still 
cited as controlling authority in the antitrust 
actions involving other fields of business, we 
now specifically limit the rule there established 
to the facts there involved, i.e., the business 
of professional baseball. As long as Congress 
continues to acquiesce, we should adhere to -
but not extend - the interpretation of the Act 
26 
made in those cases." 
The Court then acknowledged the inconsistency of this ruling 
and admitted that: 
"Were we considering the question of baseball 
for the first time upon a clean slate we would 
have no doubts. But ••• the orderly way to 
eliminate error or distinction, if any there be, 
27 
is by legislation and not by court decision." 
______ j 
(L.o) 
As a result, the Sherman Act is applicable to football while 
"the repercussions of overruling precedent precluded (the Court) 
28 
from correcting its past errors" with regard to baseball. 
In addition to being denied an antitrust exemption, the NFL 
saw its version of the reserve clause, the "Rozelle Rule", in-
validated by the judiciary in the mid-1970's. First in Kaop v. 
29 
National Football League, and finally in Mackey v. National 
30 
Football League , the courts held that "the practices under the Rozelle 
Rule • • • are an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore 
31 
a violation of the antitrust prohibition." Judge Larson's decision 
in Mackey "amounted to an emphatic rejection of the traditional 
32 
justifications for player restraints." 
The contractual devices used to control player movement between 
member clubs was also invalidated on antitrust grounds in professional 
33 34 
basketball and professional hockey in the 1970's. Even individual 
35 36 
sports like golf and bowling have been brought under the purview of 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In sum, "it is clear that other types 
of sports and entertainment will not be allowed to share baseball's 
37 
special status." 
III. Flood: The anomaly continues 
Professional baseball's antitrust exemption was once again 
attacked in the early 1970's. In Salerno v. American League of 
38 
Professional Baseball Clubs , the second circuit court ruled against 
two umpires who alleged to have been discharged because of their 
attempts to organize American League umpires for the purpose of 
(41) 
collective bargaining. By declining to overrule Federal Baseball 
and Toalson, "the judiciary once again diminished the likelihood of 
39 
success in a lower court challenge to the baseball exemption." 
However, the lower court issued a terse commentary on the Supreme 
Court's holdings: 
"We freely acknowledge our belief that 
Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice 
Holmes' happiest days, that the rationale of 
Toalson is extremely dubious and that, to use 
the Supreme Court's own adjectives, the 
distinction between baseball and other pro-
fessional sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsistent' 
and 'illogical' ••• However, we continue to 
believe that the Supreme Court should retain 
the exclusive privilege of overruling its own 
decisions, save perhaps ¥hen opinions already 
delivered have created a near certainty that only 
the occasion is needed for pronouncement of the 
doom. While we should not fall out of our chairs 
with surprise at the news that Federal Baseball 
and Toalson has been overruled, we are not at 
all certain the Court is ready to give them a 
happy dispatch." 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear for the third, and possibly 
last, time a case calling for the removal of baseball's antitrust 
exemption in Flood v. Kuhn. 
(42) 
41 
In 1969, the St. Louis Cardinals traded their co-captain and 
star center fielder, Curt Flood, to the Philadelphia Phillies. How-
ever, "Flood did something that transformed him immediately from 
just another big league baseball player into a crusader, a radical, 
42 
a reformer. He refused to go." 
Flood was appalled that he was traded without ever being 
consulted or given an opportunity to express his opinion on the 
matter. He even wrote a letter to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn claiming 
that he had a right to negotiate a contract with other clubs. In that 
letter, he stated that: 
"after twelve years in the Major Leagues, I do 
not feel that I am a piece of property to be 
bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I 
believe that any system which produces that 
result violates my basic right as a citizen 
and is inconsistent with the laws of the 
43 
United States." 
Flood then filed suit claiming that baseball's reserve system 
was a direct violation of the Sherman Act. In the petitioner's brief, 
the reserve system is depicted as: 
"the scheme which binds every American professional 
baseball player to one team, and which compels 
team owners, whether competitors or not, to boy-
cott the player property of another team owner -
and to boycott any fellow owner to eliminate 
competition in the recruitment and retention 
"44 
of personnel. 
(43) 
45 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in a 5-3 decision ruled that 
it was up to Congress to eliminate baseball's anomalous exemption, 
46 
thereby reaffirming Federal Baseball and Toalson. Specifically, 
Justice Blackmun noted that, "(s)ince Toalson more than 50 bills 
have been introduced into Congress relative to the applicability or 
47 
nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to baseball." However, 
none of these bills have passed both houses. Therefore, 
"the Court concluded that it was not dispositive 
that Congress had failed to act, for they had 
'acted', in the Court's view, with no intention 
to subject baseball's reserve system to the 
48 
reach of its antitrust statutes." 
As noted, the Court believed that Congress had no intention 
of subjecting baseball and its reserve system to federal antitrust 
laws. Of equal importance was the majority's contention that the 
legislators were better suited to handle the problems of eliminating 
a 50 year aberration. This was summed up by Justice Blackmun: 
"The Court has expressed concern about the 
confusion and the retroactivity problems 
that inevitably would result vdth a judicial 
overturning of Federal Baseball. It has voiced 
a preference that if any change is to be made, 
it come by legislative action that, by its 
49 
nature, is only prospective in operation." 
(44) 
There is another important reason why the Justices failed to 
eliminate what even they admitted to be an "anomaly11 and an 
50 
"aberration". This is the Court's rigid adherence to stare decisis. 
Simply put, courts traditionally "refuse to overrule prior statutory 
51 
interpretations." Often times, the judiciary feels that by not 
following precedent, they overstep their judicial powers by impinging 
upon the legislative branch. "If the legislature disagrees with the 
initial interpretation, the argument runs, then it has the sole 
52 
mandate to change the law by amending the statute." 
Thus, the Supreme Court was compelled to acknowledge that even 
though "professional baseball is 
53 
a business and it is engaged in 
interstate commerce," it is still "deemed fully entitled to the 
54 
benefit of stare decisis." 
Many scholars feel that Flood closes the door on future litigation 
with regard to baseball's antitrust exemption. As Nancy Jean l1eissner 
notes, Flood "makes it expressly clear that baseball's reserve 
55 
system is not subject to antitrust attack in the courts." In fact, 
"future plaintiffs would, thusly, not be well advised to return to the 
judicial system armed with only a bat and the Sherman Act to do battle 
56 
with baseball's antitrust exemption." 
However, there are other scholars that feel that "the latest 
Supreme Court pronouncement is not likely to be the last word regard-
57 
ing one of the last vestages of human bondage in the United States." 
In addition, there are numerous other aspects of this uniquely protected 
sport which may in fact be subjected to litigation. "Antitrust issues 
_____ j 
(45) 
might arise in connection with the movement of franchises, denial 
of franchises to interested investors or their cities, league or 
club control of stadiums, and intrusion by established clubs on 
58 
newly formed leagues." It is also feasible that the various 
types of league and club contracts pertaining to such business 
aspects as television, radio and concession revenues will fall 
within the purview of the antitrust laws. 
In other words, the Supreme Court has granted baseball an 
anomalous antitrust exemption through its repeated adherence to 
the Federal Baseball decision and its deference to Congress to 
settle this issue. However, it seems unlikely that either the 
judicial or legislative branches of government "intended that 
every activity connected with baseball, no matter how tangential, 
59 
enjoys the protection of the immunity umbrella." 
Section 2.2 Criticisms of the Judiciary 
I. Dissenting Opinions of Supreme Court Justices 
Criticism of the judiciary's handling of baseball's anti-
trust exemption is widespread. Newspapers, periodicals, and 
scholarly journals continually chastise the judicial branch for 
creating and upholding this anomaly on the basis of stare decisis 
and deference to Congress. More importantly, there are those 
within the judiciary who also disagree with the Supreme Court. 
As a result, this analysis of the criticisms of the judiciary 
begins with an examination of the opinions of the dissenting 
(46) 
justices in Toalson and Flood. 
Justice Burton, with whom Justice Reed concurred, wrote 
the dissenting opinion in Toalson. His main contention was that: 
11it is a contradiction in terms to say that 
the defendants in the cases before us are 
not now engaged in interstate trade or commerce 
as those terms are used in the Constitution 
6o 
of the United States and the Sherman Act. 11 
He cited such interstate business activities as traveling between 
the states, purchasing materials in interstate commerce, radio 
and television broadcasts beyond state lines, and baseball's 
61 
farm system which involves member teams in various states. 
He also noted that in 1922, baseball was not involved in 
much interstate commerce and therefore he does not disagree with 
the Supreme Court's rationale at that time. However, Justice 
Burton emphasizes that: 
11 in the Federal Baseball Club case the Court 
did not state that even if the activities of 
organized baseball amounted to interstate 
trade or commerce those activities were exempt 
62 
from the Sherman Act. 11 
In fact, Justice Holmes, the writer of the Court's opinion in 
Federal Baseball, made this clear in an opinion written a year 
after that landmark antitrust case. He said that, "it may be 
that what in general is incidental, in some instances ~ay rise 
to a magnitude that requires it to be considered independently" 
(47) 
63 
in order to determine its legality within the Sherman Act. 
Justice Burton also gives weight to the fact that the judiciary, 
and not Congress, is responsible for baseball's antitrust exemption. 
As a result, he dissents from the majority for the primary reason 
that professional baseball is involved in "interstate trade or 
commerce and, as such, it is subject to the Sherman Act until ex-
64 
empted" by Congress. 
There were two dissenting opinions submitted by Justices 
65 
Douglas and Marshall in Flood v. Kuhn. While these opinions 
focus on different aspects of professional baseball and its ex-
emption, they represent interesting arguments for "bring(ing) 
66 
baseball within the coverage of the antitrust laws." 
Justice Douglas called his brethren's continued upholding 
of Federal Baseball "a derelict in the stream of the law that we, 
its creator, should remove." This is due to the fact that "base-
ball is today big business that is packaged with beer, with broad-
casting, and with other industries. " £. 7 
He also attacks baseball's reserve clause which makes the 
players victims of the owners' "proclivity for predatory practices." 
Justice Douglas refers to the players as "victims" since according 
to the Sherman Act, "a contract which forbids anyone to practice 
68 
69 
his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint of trade." 
Using Congressional inaction as a guide to ~aintaining the in-
consistent application of federal antitrust laws is also denounced 
by Justice Douglas. This is an aberration in itself since the 
(48) 
Supreme Court has already said that Congressional silence should 
70 
not prevent judicial re-examination of its own doctrines. As a 
result, "the unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us 
71 
from correcting our own mistakes." 
Justice Marshall's dissent takes homage in the fact that 
baseball's reserve system makes the players virtual slaves of the 
owners. "The essence of that system is that a player is bound 
to the club with which he first signs a contract for the rest of 
72 
his playing days." As a result, the reserve system acts as 
an unreasonable restraint of trade. Therefore, Justice ~~rshall 
felt compelled to make the following commentary: 
"We do not lightly overrule our prior 
constructions of federal statutes, but when 
our errors deny substantial federal rights, 
like the right to compete freely and effective-
ly to the best of one's ability as guaranteed 
by the antitrust laws, we must admit our error 
73 
and correct it." 
Justice Marshall also gave a solution to the debate over 
retroactively solving the problem as court decisions usually do, 
or deferring to the Congress and its prospective effects on 
eliminating the exemption. Simply put, the Court can make its 
reversal prospective only. As Justice !-1arshall stated, "baseball 
should be covered by the antitrust laws beginning with this case 
74 
and henceforth, unless Congress decides otherwise." 
(49) 
II. Scholarly Criticisms 
Scholars have tended to agree with Justices Burton, Douglas, 
and Marshall. The most frequent criticisms are aimed at the 
Court's,: strict adherence to stare decisis~ deference to a 
Congressional solution; and proclivity in upholding the exemption 
while the Court itself has classified it as being "unrealistic, 
75 
inconsistent, or illogical." 
Stare decisis is an important tool in maintaining consistency 
in judicial interpretations of the law. However, it should not be 
used to imprison reason. When faced with previous decisions that 
are out of sync with the present conditions, the Court should 
acknowledge this or fear falling out of step with the times. 
C. Paul Roger believes that Flood v. Kuhn "illustrates the 
kind of illogical and inconsistent propositions that a strict 
76 
adherence to the principles of stare decisis can produce." 
In other words, is maintaining uniform and consistent interpretations 
of the law "justified when the result is the affirmance of a 
77 
decision acknowledged to be an anachronism?" 
Nancy Jean Meissner agrees. She says that the Supreme Co,rr:. 
haS 11 ClOSed r_i ts'. dOOrS and refused to right admitted \ITOn.§;S o 11 
Instead of repeali:1g the anti trust e:{emption it e;ave to baseball 
in 1922, the judiciary has chosen "to rely on an anor:1alcms appli-
cation of stare decisis in refusing to grant relief from a system 
which claimed perpetual control of employees in an industry rife 
78 
with violation of the Sherman Act." 
11
'tlhile ?load possibly represents the Court's greatest 
(50) 
79 
expression of deference to Congressional silence," many scholars 
espouse the opposite view which states that judicial decisions 
should not be influenced by legislative inactivity. Justice 
Frankfurter summed up this opposing viewpoint in the 1940 case, 
Helvering v. Hallock: 
"It would require very persuasive circmnstances 
enveloping Congressional silence to debar this 
court from re-examining its own doctrines. 
To explain the cause of non-action by Congress 
when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture 
80 
into speculative unrealities." 
Judicial deference to Congress is also criticized for its buck-
passing nature which has no guarantee for success. As the Notre 
Dame Lawyer states, the Supreme Court could have resolved the 
''retroactivity difficulties by ruling prospectively instead of 
81 
deferring to Congress." This would have rescinded the anomalous 
exemption. This is especially important since "there is no guarantee 
that Congress will act in the future to overrule the baseball 
82 
decisions which the Supreme Court has now come to loathe." 
The third major reason why scholars are critical of Toalson 
and Kuhn, is that baseball's exemption is an illogical aberration 
from the Court's rulings with regard to other professional sports 
and businesses. 
Philip 1. V~rtin feels that there are problems with the Court's 
rationale in Flood in lieu of the fact that it still classifies 
(51) 
baseball's present status as an aberration. He proclaims that, 
"this is rather strong language which indicates that the reserve 
83 
system does not measure up to legal standards." Martin adds 
that, "the anomalous baseball exemption constitutes a denial of 
individual rights being upheld by the exercise of some very dubious 
84 
legal reasoning." 
Perhaps the most stinging remarks on the judiciary's contin-
uance of this anomaly were made by Lionel s. Sobel before the 
House Select Committee on Professional Sports in 1976. He said 
that, "professional baseball is the only exempt enterprise whose 
exemption is not derived from a statute enacted by this Congress, 
85 
but rather from an exemption created by a court." 
Section 2.3 - Congressional Silence 
The sports triangle has taken on a new twist with regard to 
this issue of baseball's antitrust exemption. Although the 
Supreme Court originally acted in 1922 by granting the exemption 
to our national pastime, it has refused to re-examine the issue. 
In essence, the judges won't judge. Instead, the judiciary has 
passed the buck to Congress. However, the law makers have seen 
fit to remain silent by allowing over 70 bills to go unpassed 
in the last thirty years. Therefore, the legislators won't 
legislate. 
This section chronologically reviews the "legislative history 
of baseball's antitrust exemption, for only in doing so is it 
possible to fully understana its current status and the reasons 
86 
behind it." The second part of this section attempts to explain 
(52) 
why Congress has been negligent in terminating this exemption. 
I. Legislative History 
A. The 82nd Congress 
In 1951, Emanuel Geller's Subcommittee on the Study of 
Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, began to 
extensively investigate whether all professional team sports 
should be exempt from federal antitrust laws or if baseball should 
87 
come within the Sherman Act's parameter. Three identical bills 
were introduced and provided that the federal antitrust laws 
"shall not apply to organized professional sports enterprises 
88 
or to acts in the conduct of such enterprises." However, Geller's 
subcommittee concluded that no legislative action should be taken 
since it was unsure whether baseball's reserve clause violated 
antitrust laws: 
"It would • • • seem premature to enact general 
legislation for baseball at this time. Legis-
lation is not necessary until the reasonableness 
of the reserve rules has been tested by the 
courts •••• For these reasons, together with 
the Subcommittee's earnest desire to avoid in-
fluencing pending litigation, it is unwise to 
attempt to anticipate judicial action with 
89 
legislation." 
An identical bill, S.l526, introduced by Senator Johnson of 
Colorado 'll'as also tabled \vhen the Senate Judiciary Corr.mi ttee 
90 
"voted to postpone its consideration indefinitely." 
(53) 
B. The 83rd Congress 
In 1954, Representative Celler changed positions when he 
introduced H.R. 7949. This bill would have made the antitrust 
laws applicable to baseball. Celler introduced this bill because 
the "Courts had given preferred treatment to baseball ••• because 
91 
of the confusion confounded over what constitues a business." 
However, the House Judiciary Committee did not act on H.R. 7949. 
c. The 85th Congress 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Radovich 
that "the orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination • 
92 
is by legislation and not by court decision", the House of 
. . 
Representatives introduced in 1957 seven bills to eliminate dis-
crepancies between professional team sports under the antitrust 
statutes. These bills were referred to the House Judiciary Committee 
and constitute three distinct solutions to the antitrust problem: 
l. eliminate the judicially created exemption by placing profession-
93 
al baseball under the Sherman Act ; 2. completely exempt all pro-
94 
fessional team sports ; and 3. place all professional team sports 
under federal antitrust laws, yet allow certain activities, unique 
to athletic competition and cooperation, be exempted from those 
95 
laws. 
Although over 50 'Nitnesses testified in the two weeks of 
hearings before Celler's Antitrust Subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee, Congress maintained its silence by not acting 
on any of the bills. 
In 1958, the House 1vas again involved in antitrust legislation 
involving baseball's unique status. Representative Celler introduced 
L_ ___ ----------------- ----------- --------------
H. R. 10378 as a compromise solution to the antitrust debate. 
The bill declared that: 
"the professional team sports of baseball, foot-
ball, basketball, and hockey come within the 
purview of the antitrust laws, but exempted 
from those laws such activities of team sports 
which were 'reasonably necessary' to these 
96 
ends." 
Geller cited three such activities: "(1) the equalization of 
competitive playing strengths; (2) the right to operate within 
specified geographic areas; or (3) the preservation of public 
97 
confidence in the honesty in sports contests." 
98 
On June 24, 1958, H. R. 10378, as amended, became the first 
piece of legislation pertaining to baseball's antitrust status to 
be passed by a house of Congress. However, s. 4070, Senator 
Henning's counterpart to Representative Geller's bill, was tabled 
by the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee. Thus, what promised to be 
a significant attempt by Congress to meet the judiciarJ's challenge 
to act on baseball's anomalous exemption, ended in typical con-
gressional silence. 
D. The 86th Congress 
The Senate re-examined its tabling of the compromise anti-
trust legislation from the previous Congress in 1959. Senators 
Hennings, Dirksen, and Keating introduced s. 616 which was 
virtually identical to the tabled s. 4070. Senator Kefauver, 
chairman of the Senate Antitrust & Monopoly Subcommittee, intra-
(55) 
duced his own bill, s. 886 which "made the exemptions of s. 616 
effective only in the event of the agreement of each major league 
99 
Club to limit to 80 the number of players under its control." 
Following hearings on s. 616 and s. 886, Kefauver abruptly reversed 
himself by introducing S. 2545. This bill vias identical to S. 616 
yet excluded professional baseball. Kefauver said that baseball 
was excluded because: 
"the problem of baseball differs from that of 
the other three sports. The Subcommittee wishes 
to spend more time on the study of baseball's 
complexities so that there will be an orderly 
transition from its present status of almost 
complete exemption from the antitrust laws to a 
status of limited exemption similar to that of 
100 
the three sports covered in this bill." 
Not surprisingly, the Senate Judiciary Committee indefinitely 
postponed consideration of s. 616, s. 886, and s. 2545. 
The Congressional trend of introducing bills and then fail-
ing to act on them continued throughout the 86th Congress. In 
101 
the House, six bills were introduced pertaining to professional 
team sports' relationship with federal antitrust laws. Aside 
from hearings held by the House Antitrust Subcommittee on these 
proposals, no further action was taken. In the Senate, another 
bill introduced by Senator Kefauver, s. 3483, was tabled by the 
Judiciary Committee. 
E. The 87th Congress 
Senator Kefauver introduced s. 168, an identical bill to the 
one (S.3483) that was tabled in the previous session. The club 
owners in professional baseball opposed it "to the extent that 
it discriminated against baseball by limiting player control to 
102 
40 players." However, the owners did support Senator Hart's 
bill, S.l856, since it did not contain a 40 player limit. Not 
surprisingly, these bills died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
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Also true to form, the House introduced three bills similar 
to S.l856, yet failed to act on any of them. 
F. The 88th Congress 
Congress came very close to passing an antitrust bill re-
garding baseball's exemption during this session. In 1964, 
Organized Baseball voiced its support of Congressional sanction 
of its antitrust exemption and equal antitrust status of profession-
al team sports in hearings before the Senate's Antitrust Sub-
committee. The hearings were held on behalf of S.239l, a bill sub-
mitted by Senator Hart which was identical to the bill (S.l856) 
that he sponsored in the 87th Congress. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee favorably reported S.239l without amendment on August 
104 
4, 1964. However, "the full Senate 
105 
before the end of the session." 
lo6 
was unable to act on it 
In the House, 14 bills identical to Senator Hart's S.239l 
were introduced. However, no hearings were held and no action 
107 
was taken on them by the House Judiciary Con~ttee. 
G. The 89th Congress 
Congress took perhaps its biggest step toward acting on 
baseball's anomalous antitrust status in 1965. Senator Hart again 
(57) 
submitted a bill (S.950) which he said would: 
"place the organized professional team sports 
of baseball, football, basketball, and hockey on 
equal antitrust footing and then [would~ grant 
exemptions relating to the essential sports 
practices as opposed to the business practices 
108 
of the sports involved." 
As a result, S.950 would have eliminated baseball's distinct status 
by placing it within the purview of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
However, it also would have granted antitrust exempti8ns to such 
practices as drafting, the reserve clause, and restricting the 
109 
geographic area in which team members operated. 
What is most significant about s.950, is that the legislators 
openly recognized the need to end their history of silence on 
this matter. Senator Hart summed up this attitude in the "State-
ment" section of this bill: 
"This legislation, then, is in response to the 
judicial decisions which have placed the respons-
ibility for reconciling the conflicting cases 
110 
directly in the hands of Congress." 
lll 
The full Senate passed S.950 on August 31, ~S65. However, 
a~ identical bill (H.R.l785) was introduced in the House by Rep-
resentative Hofton, but was never acted upon. Similarly, two 
112 
other bills "which would have nade the antitrust laws applicable 
to baseball without specific exemptions, vlere also refer~ed to ~he 
113 
! :buse Judiciary Committee in 1961 but were never ac:ed upon." 
Alas, Congress again shunned its responsibility for reconciling 
baseball's antitrust aberration. 
H. The 90th Congress 
Only two bills dealing with professional baseball and the 
federal antitrust laws were introduced in this Congress. H. R. 
6, introduced by Representative Zablocki, was intended "to make 
114 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts fully applicable to baseball." 
H. R. 467, sponsored by Representative Davis, was similar to 
H. R. 6 "except that it also would have applied the Federal 
ll5 
Trade Commission Act to baseball.'·' Once again, no action was 
taken on either of these bills. 
I. The 9lst Congress 
Representative Davis again introduced legislation intended 
to place baseball within the purview of the antitrust law. How-
ll6 
ever, no committee action was taken on H.R. 2349. 
J. The 92nd Congress 
Following the Flood decision, the House Antitrust Subcommittee 
held hearings on three separate solutions to baseball's antitrust 
distinction. Emanuel Geller, still chairman of House Committee 
on the Judiciary as well as the Antitrust Subcommittee, acknowledged 
that Justice Blackmun called upon Congress to resolve the estab-
lished "aberration" that allows baseball to operate with an antitrust 
exemption while other interstate professional team sports do not. 
As a result, Representative Geller said that: 
"It is for the Congress and for this committee 
to remedy the illogic and put an end to this 
senseless anomaly. These hearings and consider-
ations of the bills before us are a step in 
117 
that direction." 
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One solution was proposed in four identical bills supported 
by Representative Celler. The bills were designed "to end base-
ball's judicial exemption by providing that the words 'trade and 
commerce' as used in any provision of the antitrust laws shall 
119 
include the interstate business of baseball." As Representative 
Celler emphasized: 
"Enactment of legislation of this type would be 
appropriate as a long overdue statement of con-
gressional intention to include this very lucra-
tive business with the mainstream of American 
antitrust legislation •• The important 
thing is to once and for all end unwarranted 
privilege and place all professional sports on 
120 
equal footing." 
The second solution was put forward by Representative Horton 
in H.R. 2305. This bill proposed to place the four major organ-
ized professional team sports under the antitrust laws while 
121 
exempting certain aspects of the sports industry. Representative 
Horton said that the goal of H.R. 2305 was to: 
"place all four major professional sports under 
the antitrust laws. However, it would exempt 
from antitrust exposure those on the field 
(60) 
practices which, due to the unique character 
of these sports businesses, are necessary for 
the successful, competitive survival of the 
122 
sports themselves." 
The third type of solution was suggested by Representative 
123 
Celler in H.R. 11033. Along with three identical bills , this 
piece of legislation proposed to place the business of organized 
professional team sports under the antitrust laws without exempt-
124 
ing certain practices of the sports industry. One such practice 
that Representative Horton's bill (H.R. 2305) would have exempted 
was the reserve clauses in professional sports contracts. How-
ever, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. spoke at these hearings in favor 
of H.R. 11033 since it would not have exempted such sports practices. 
He said that: 
"The reserve clause denies players their freedom 
of contract, a liberty guaranteed through both 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
u.s. Constitution. The reserve clause reduces a 
human being to chattel, a possession like a 
125 
piece of furniture." 
Although these hearings were possibly the most extensive and 
all-encompassing with regard to baseball's antitrust status, the 
House failed to pass any of the three solutions. 
K. The 94th Congress 
On May 18, 1976, the House of Representatives established the 
Select Committee on Professional Sports "to investigate the 
(61) 
situation currently prevailing in the four major professional 
sports • • • and to assess the need for any recommended changes 
126 
in the law. 11 One of the areas that this select committee 
investigated was "the impact of federal anti-trust policy on 
127 
sports business operations. 11 
In its Draft Report Prepared by the Staff Select Committee 
on Professional Sports, Chairman B. F. Sisk and his colleagues 
recommended that professional baseball be subject to the antitrust 
128 
laws. However, this report was heavily criticized for failing 
129 
"to analyze the impact that those laws would have on baseball." 
Consequently, no legislative action was taken. 
L. The 97th Congress 
On July 28, 1982, Senator DeConcini introduced S.2784, the 
"Major League Sports Community Protection Act of 1982. 11 The bill 
was intended 11 to clarify the application of the antitrust laws 
to professional team sports leagues, to protect the public interest 
in maintaining the stability of professional team sports leagues, 
130 
and for other purposes. 11 However, the Congress took its most 
significant step toward cementing its 30 year silence with regard 
to the baseball exemption by defining for purposes of this Act 
the term 'professional team sports league' as 11 the organized 
professional team sports of basketball, football, hockey, or soccer." 
By purposely omitting baseball, the legislatures have refused to 
examine and clarify the application of antitrust laws to profession-
al baseball. 
131 
(62) 
II. Why Has Congress Failed to Act? 
In the past three decades, Congress has closely examined 
the application of the federal antitrust statutes to professional 
team sports through the introduction of over 70 bills. "Yet 
despite all this congressional attention, the law in this area 
remains, with few exceptions, essentially the same as the Supreme 
132 
Court delineated it in the Toalson" and Flood cases. This is due 
to the fact that: 
"Congress has not seen fit to 'unexempt' baseball, 
nor have they seen fit to reinforce the exemption, 
judicially conferred, in light of respected calls 
133 
for a congressional stand on the issue." 
There are two reasons why the legislative branch has failed 
to act on the issue of baseball's antitrust exemption. The 
first is that the judicial decisions in Federal Baseball, Toalson, 
and Flood have been approved by a majority in Congress. 
"The inaction of Congress in the face of these 
decisions, ~all~ of which invite Congress ta 
act, would seem to indicate that there is a 
policy favoring the exemption of baseball from 
134 
antitrust laws." 
Congress has continually recognized that: 
"the structure of organized baseball, and the 
growth of its business relationships and internal 
agreements which have been in reliance on the 
federal exemption, are all integral components of 
135 
organized baseball as it now exists." 
(63) 
As a result, legislators argue that it would be inappropriate 
to apply any type of antitrust provision. 
Even though both Houses have never agreed on an antitrust 
bill, Congress has almost always "endorsed the view that pro-
fessional team sports are unique enterprises which require business 
cooperation among competitors in order that fair and honest 
136 
competition on the athletic field is preserved and promoted." 
137 
In fact, on the two occasions that one house of Congress voted 
in favor of a sports antitrust bill, an antitrust exemption for 
certain activities pertaining to the sports industry "has been 
included and deemed necessary to maintain competitive equality 
138 
among member teams." 
The second reason for congressional inaction is that "there 
has been insufficient external pressure exerted upon the nation's 
legislative representatives to sustain any action to dissolve the 
139 
exemption." Put simply, organized baseball and its represent-
ative player's union lacks "an influential power base in any of 
140 
the geographical areas where it operates." Whereas other businesses 
have a larger number of employees concentrated in a particular 
state or district, baseball employees "are scattered sparsely 
throughout the country where an appeal to local representation 
141 
·..rould create minimal impact in comparison." 
As a result of Congress's inaction and silence, the judicially 
created and admitted anomaly continues. Nevertheless, it remains 
abundantly clear that "if the antitrust laws, in whole or in part, 
(64) 
should be applied to Organized Baseball, that decision !-will: be 
142 
made by Congress, not by the courts." 
Section 2.4 Non-judicial and non-legislative solutions 
"Since the late 1800's, baseball players have literally served 
under the thumb of their economic 'owners' unable to enforce the 
143 
antitrustl laws of our country against their employers." This 
inability to secure numerous basic employee rights through judicial 
or legislative resolution, has forced the players to unite in 
order to establish a more equitable reserve system. As a result, 
non-judicial and non-legislative functions are being used to 
resolve baseball's antitrust aberration. Since the judges won't 
judge and the legislators won't legislate, baseball players have 
turned to collective bargaining, arbitration, and free agency in 
order to eliminate the inequities of baseball's "monopolistic" 
reserve system. Nonetheless, there are those who argue whether 
these solutions are adequate. 
I. Collective Barga~ning 
While the early 1970's marked the boom period for antitr'J.st 
litigation, many knowledgeable observers believe that the 80's will 
witness a diminished resort to the antitrust courts. This is due 
to the ~act that the past decade has: 
"laid the groundwork .:::"'or application of another 
exemption which may remove many significant 
issues from the purview of the antitrust laws. 
The exenption in question is that which is afford-
ed to employment-related agreements arrived at 
(65) 
144 
through collective bargaining." 
In 1976, the Nation Labor Relations Board recognized the 
Major League Baseball Players Association as the exclusive bar-
145 
gaining agent for all members of the players association. As a 
result, baseball players who had long been denied the ability to 
prevent certain ~obility restraints through the use of antitrust 
litigation, "gained the power to bargain with club owners to 
146 
establish the terms of a system of reserve." 
Not only did the players gain the power to bargain w~th club 
owners, they used it (along ~'lith the threat of a season-long strike) 
to their advantage in revamping the reserve system. On July 12, 
1976, it was announced that a four-year collective bargaining 
agreement had been reached by the baseball owners and players' 
representatives, As noted by baseball Commissioner Bmne Kuhn: 
"This new labor pact was the product of 
compromise and intense negotiation. But, the 
significant point is that this settlement was 
achieved at the bargaining table, not in ar- anti-
147 
trust suit." 
In general, the collective bargaining agreement of 1976 
accommodated the mmers' needs for player control ivhile granting 
the players a more competitive market !,or their services. ltJOre 
specifically, the reserve system was fundamentally revamped with 
the elimination of the reserve clause which had allovred the 
owners to rene~ each player's contract for one-year periods. The 
key provisions of the agreement are: 
(66) 
"A player will have the right to demand to 
be traded after having played in the major 
leagues for 5 years. He will have a veto 
right over six clubs. If he is not traded, 
he will beccme a free agent. 
Players who become free agents . will be 
able to negotiate with a maximum of 12 teams 
starting with the inverse order of the pre-
vious seasons standings. Each club will be 
limited in the number of free agents it may 
sign, being permitted a maximum of one if the 
free agent pool totals l to 14 players. HovT-
ever, a club will be able to sign as many free 
agents as it might lose in a season. 
The only compensation for a lost player will 
be a draft choice. If one of the 12 lowest 
teams signs a free agent it Vlill lose a second 
round draft choice. If one of the top l2 te~~s 
signs a player, it forfeits its Ho. 1 draft 
choice. 
Salary arbitration is reinstituted. But if a 
player is eligible to be a free agent, his dispute 
can go to arbitration only by mutual consent of 
the player and club. 
The minimum salary is to be raised from $16,000 
to $21,000 by 1979. 
(67) 
The owners agreed to add $1.85 million to the 
148 
players pension fnnd." 
II. Free Agency and Arbitration 
The inclusion of free agency and grievance-arbitration pro-
cedures in the 1976 agreement stem from baseball's establishment 
of an arbitration system in the 1973 Basic Agreement which ended 
baseball's first season-delaying strike by the players. 
According to the Basic Agreement, "all contract disputes 
are now to be settled by a three member board consisting of one 
representative selected by each party and a third mutual partici-
149 
pant chosen by the two." As a result, arbitration of salary dis-
putes by an impartial arbitrator "took many issues away from the 
sole province of the commissioner who is hired exclusively by the 
150 
club owners." 
Controversy over this arbitration system did not evolve 
nntil the fall of 1974. Jim "Catfish" Hnnter, star pitcher for 
the World Series Champion Oakland Athletics had a dispute with his 
owner, Charles o. Finley, about how deferred sal~· payments 
were to be made. Hunter contended that "because a stipulation in 
his contract had not been fulfilled, he should be declared a free 
151 
agent at liberty to negotiate with another team." 
Peter Seitz, the impartial ar~itrator who cast the deciding 
vote in this two-to-one decision, "fonnd that Finley had indeed 
failed to live up to his agreement with Hnnter, and that in such a 
case, baseball rules gave the player the right to become a free 
152 
agent." By the terms of his newly acquired status as a free agent, 
(68) 
Hunter was able to offer his services as a pitcher to any of the 
24 clubs. As a result, he signed one of sports' first multi-
million dollar contracts: a five-year $3.5 million deal with the 
Ne;.r York Yankees. 
More importantly, were the grievances filed on behalf of 
Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of 
the Montreal Expose in October of 1975. 
The owners historically maintained player control and avoided 
competitive bidding through paragraph lO(a) of the Uniform Players 
153 
Contract. The "Option Clause" allowed the club to extend the 
existing contract for one year if the player didn't agree to a 
new one. "The clubs interpreted this to mean that the one-year 
extension applied to all terms of the original contract - including 
another automatic one-year extension, which made it a 'perpetual' 
154 
option." 
However, Messersmith and McNally felt that since they played the 
1975 season under the Option Clause (i.e. under the one year 
contract they had signed prior to the 1974 season), they had ful-
filled all contractual terms and obligations and were thus free 
agents. 
The grievances were submitted to arbitration with Seitz again 
in the role of impartial arbitrator. On December 23, 1975, a 
monumental interpretation of paragraph lO(a) of the Uniform Players 
Contract and the Ma,j or League Rules was handed down. Seitz ruled 
that: 
"the relevant provisions did not renew the 
contract in perpetuity, thereby denying the 
right of a club to perpetually control a player. 
Messersmith and McNally are declared free 
155 
agents." 
The club owners responded by firing Seitz and asking a federal 
court to rule that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. 
However, the district court in Kansas Cit~ Royals Baseball Corp. 
15 
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n. held that: 
"the Messersmith-McNally grievances were within 
the scope of the .-_arbi tratio~~ panel's juris-
diction and neither the resolution of the merits, 
nor the relief awarded, exceeded the panel's 
157 
authority." 
The United States Court of Appeals' affirmation of the district 
court's finding thus emancipated the players from a control 
system that had traditionally bound each player to the club with 
which he first signed a contract for the rest of his playing 
days. 
As noted above, the result of the Hunter, Messersmith, and 
McNally grievances has been a fundamental revamping of baseball's 
reserve system through the inclusion of free agency and arbitration 
in baseball's collective bargaining agreement. 
III. Are These Non-Judicial and Non-Legislative Solutions Adequate? 
"It has been offered that as a by-product of the labor exempt:.on, 
antitrust is no longer a predominate feature of disputes in pro-
fessional athletics, primarily owing to the advent of collective 
(70) 
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bargaining." F..owever, are the non-judicial and non-legislative 
solutions achieved through collective bargaining enough to justify 
baseball's antitrust exemption? Or for that matter, are they 
adequate in establishing and maintaining an equitable reserve 
system? 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn and Marvin Miller, executive director 
of the players' association from 1976-1982, have opposing views on 
these and other questions pertaining to baseball's antitrust 
exemption. Their opinions are extensively noted in Section 2.5. 
However, it is useful to preview their overriding positions with 
regard to the adequacy of these non-judicial and non-legislative 
solutions. 
Kuhn thinks that collective bargaining has removed "the major 
irritant for antitrust liability over the course of the last three 
159 
decades - the status of player rights." Furthermore, the collective 
bargaining agreement reached in 1976, "is proof-positive that the 
present status of baseball under our Cantitrust~ laws is appropriate." 
Similarly, the recently fired commissioner believes that: 
"we have demonstrated that baseball is acting in a 
highly responsible fashion under the present law, 
and further that if problems exist in the present 
system they would not be solved through the 
application of the antitrust laws. Rather, I 
thi~ it is quite clear that the application 
of those laws to baseball would only be counter-
160 
161 
prodt:.ctive and detrimental to the public interest." 
(71) 
Miller disagrees with this sanguine perspective of baseball's 
management. He contends that, "what turned things around, of 
course, was not the good will or fair-mindedness of the club 
owners, but rather the Messersmith case •••• Then and only then 
were the owners first interested in modifying the reserve system." 
As a result, it is still necessary for the courts or Congress to 
remove baseball's antitrust exemption. Otherwise, the owners 
163 
could return to "their oppressive reserve system with impunity" 
after subsequent collective bargaining agreements terminate. 
Others agree with Hiller and suggest that "antitrust could 
still be an important device to maintain a checking influence on 
164 
the bargaining process ~of~ baseball in the 1980's." They 
point to such issues as player related rules not covered in 
collective bargaining, league decisions with respect to franchise 
location, and rules pertaining to league governance as being 
applicable to antitrust litigation. 
Still others contend that baseball's non-judicial and non-
legislative solutions are inadequate and inappropriate. The 
Sporting News, often referred to as the "Baseball Bible", wrote 
162 
an editorial entitled "Something Out of Whack" to describe baseball's 
165 
salary-arbitration system. In it, they criticize the often 
illogical decisions of baseball's arbitrators who demonstrate: 
166 
"(a) disregard for the dollar, or (b) ignorance of the game." 
See Appendix II 
Whether baseball's resolutions to its monopolistic reserve 
system are adequate in solving the problems associated with a 
(72) 
business exemption from federal antitrust laws is yet to be seen. 
However, one ~ust commend the industry as a whole for its ability 
to rise above judicial and legislative inaction, in attempting 
to resolve its contractual inequities. 
Section 2.5 - Baseball's Opposing Viewpoints 
As noted in the previous section, the leading figures for 
baseball's management and players' association have diametrically 
opposing viewpoints 1rl. th regard to baseball's anti trust exemption. 
On a number of occasions, Bolrl.e Kuhn and ~~rvin Miller have 
appeared ~r congressional hearings to justify their opinions. 
This section presents the opposing viewpoints on baseball's 
distinct status that were voiced by the sport's leaders at hearings 
before the 92nd and 94th Congresses. 
I. Bome Kuhn: Maintain the Exemption 
It is important to note that while Kuhn believes his primary 
concern as commissioner is "to protect the integrity of the 
167 
II t game, many believe that his job is o protect the owners. Kuhn 
was hired by, and gets his power from, the club owners - not the 
players. As a result, his viewpoint quite obviously echoes that 
of the owners, who are the ones that benefit from an antitrust 
exemption. 
Kuhn's remarks before the House Antitrust Subcommittee 
169 
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and Select Committee on Professional Sports can be summed up in 
four justifications for maintaining baseball's exemption: pro-
fessional baseball is unique; baseball's management has acted 
(73) 
responsibly; application of antitrust statutes would be counter-
productive; and the solution to baseball's anomalous status should 
not be the removal of its exemption, but rather the granting of 
an antitrust exemption to all professional sports. 
One of the reasons why those in baseball's management contend 
that their sport should maintain its distinct status, is that base-
ball's structure is unique when compared to other sports and even 
other businesses. Kuhn reiterated this point in 1972 \vhen he said: 
"It is a mistake • to think of professional 
sports as fungible in their problems. They are 
not. They are very different. There is no 
170 
sport as different as baseball." 
Specifically, Kuhn points to baseball's minor league system. 
Whereas professional football and basketball teams acquire their 
players directly out of college, baseball teams have to de'Telop 
their players iP.. an extensive and expensive mir:.cr league system: 
"The average expense by major league clubs to 
develop players is $1.5 million apiece per club. 
This is one of the reasons Ahy baseball nas 
argued that it has a ri;::ht to a sreater player 
control than other sports may have, because we 
are in a radically different position from other 
171 
sports. There is simply no question about •..t.. " l u. 
In li.eu of w.ique structure and problerr.s, Kuhn t'=lkes "price 
in t:1e fact that 'tTe have tried to ~a,·e a system of self-regu.latior:. 
'.Vhich, vlhile not perfect, ':re think has best sui ted the needs of 01IT 
172 
pa.r-::icCllar ind:1stry." As the recently fir:::c co::Jmissi:)Jcer stated 
173 
:.n 1)<'76, "baseball's con6uct ~las been responsible." 
In an outline of why baseball should not be brought under 
the antitrust laws which he presented before the House Select 
Committee on Professional Sports, Kuhn gave three examples of the 
responsibleness of the club owners. First - baseball presents 
its product at a modest cost to the public and on an essentially 
break-even basis to the cwners. Second -baseball's internal 
structure has provided a high degree of integrity in the game as 
well as fair procedures for resolution of disputes. And third -
baseball's minor league system provides wholesome and popular sports 
174 
entertainment for many cities throughout the country. 
Kuhn goes a step further and claims that not only is baseball 
a unique industry whose management is responsible in resolving 
internal conflicts, but application of antitrust statutes would be 
counter-productive: 
"I believe that a thorough-going study of the 
facts will demonstrate that the institution of 
baseball is fulfilling its public obligations 
quite fully under the present law, and that if 
any problems exist in our structure, they ~ill 
not be solved in the public interest by the 
175 
application of the antitrust laivs 0" 
Kuhn bases this line of reasoning on his contention that 
"the application of the antitrust laws may well threaten to upset 
the existing labor-management agreement and endanger the ability to 
176 
solve future labor problems through collective bargaining." In 
other words, the advent of collective bargaining has superseded 
(75) 
the need for antitrust application in improving player conditions: 
"Indeed, placing baseball under the antitrust 
laws might actually unsettle the existing agree-
ment between management and the players, and 
make resolution of the labor problems through 
collecting bargaining more difficult in the 
177 
future." 
This is due to the fact that if the antitrust laws are made 
applicable to professional baseball, it will open a Pandora's box 
of court cases to decide the complex issue of "the extent of the 
178 
exemption to be accorded baseball's labor agreement." Such 
judicial decisions could "threaten the carefully balanced bargain 
that has been struck between the management and the union in 
179 
baseball." Therefore, Kuhn asks the proponents of applying the 
antitrust laws to baseball this question: 
"Apart from years of litigation and tremendous 
expense, what indeed will be gained? What 
confidence have they that their approach is 
superior to the collective bargaining process and 
the Federal labor laws in resolving what are 
180 
essentially labor-management problems." 
Kuhn also attacks the logic behind those who criticize 
baseball's anomalous exemption on the grounds that it is unfair to 
apply antitrust laws to all other sports yet exempt baseball. }~ 
says that the call for equal application of federal statutes is a 
false issue: 
"The fact that other sports are forced to live 
under the antitrust laws is, by itself, no 
reason to apply those laws to baseball. Cer-
tainly no one would argue that the antitrust 
laws should apply to baseball, simply in the 
name of equality, unless the application of 
those laws is likely to result in some sub-
stantive benefit, or at least in the absence 
181 
of predictable harm." 
Kuhn notes that baseball's unequal status has been the result 
of judicial interpretation and congressional silence. As a result, 
the sport has developed over the last 60 years in reliance on 
the antitrust exemption: 
"On the other hand, the antitrust laws were 
applied to other sports at a relatively early 
point in their modern development, and their 
arrangements have been modified and worked out 
over several years with antitrust liability in 
mind. The fact that those sports might 
continue to survive under the regime of anti-
182 
trust is no assurance that baseball could." 
According to Kuhn, the solution to baseball's anomalous 
status should not be the removal of its exemption. Instead, if 
it was up to him to solve the antitrust inequalities between 
professional sports, he "would ask Congress to put all sports 
183 
in the same position that baseball now finds itself." 
(77) 
II. Marvin Miller: Remove the Exemption 
Just as Bowie Kuhn is the voice of the owners, Marvin Miller's 
viewpoints must be weighed in terms of his previous role as head 
of the players' union whose members would benefit the most from 
an application of antitrust laws to baseball. 
Miller's remarks before the House of ReprsentatiYes can also 
be summed up in four justifications for removing baseball's ex-
emption: the owners have a history of monopolistic control of 
the players; the owners were forced to act responsibly; the courts 
have urged Congress to act; and the exemption prohibits the 
players of equal protection of the law. 
At the outset of his first appearance before a congressional 
subcommittee in 1972, Miller acknowledged that: 
"Professional baseball players have an obvious and 
direct interest in the application of the anti-
trust laws to the industry in 'loJ'hich they are 
employed. At the present time, no other Americans 
in any walk of life are as tightly restricted 
by monopoly control of their services as pro-
184 
fessional baseball players." 
Even though these remarks were made prior to baseball's 
restructuring of its reserve system, it is important to note how 
monopolistic the owners have been with regard to player control. 
As stated in Section 2.1, once a player signs a contract with the 
club that drafted him, he becomes the property of that employer's 
club for life - unless otherHise disposed of by that club. As 
Miller defined the reserve system prior to 1976: 
(78) 
"The player may be traded, sold, optioned or 
otherwise assigned to other employers at the 
will of the employer club. Such assignments 
may be made without consultation or notice. 
If a player doesn't care for that system, his 
185 
only option is to retire from his calling.u 
Therefore, 11iller contends that the owners have not always 
been as responsible to the player's and public's interests as Kuhn 
would have one believe. In fact, Miller says that: 
"This comprehensive, monopolistic, lifetime con-
trol of the services of a human being in his chosen 
profession clearly is unduly restrictive and ex-
cessively anticompetitive and should be determined 
186 
to be against public policy." 
Kulm, however, believes that such monopolistic control was 
eliminated in the 1976 collective bargaining agreement. Shortly 
after its passage, he said that, "it is quite clear that the major 
irritant for antitrust liability over the course of the last three 
decades - the status of player rights - has now been removed from 
187 
the sceneu by the good will of the owners. 
Ten days after Bowie Kuhn made this remark, Marvin Miller 
gave his rebuttal to the House's Select Committee on Professional 
Sports: 
"I would like to provide clarification ~of~ Nr. 
Kuhn's argument to this committee that collective 
bargaining on baseball's reserve system has 
(79) 
worked because of baseball's peculiar antitrust 
immunity. He suggested that the club owners 
agreed to loosen the reserve system out of good 
will and because the union could not subject them 
to antitrust liability through litigation. In 
fact, quite the opposite is true. Collective 
bargaining in baseball has been impeded because 
188 
of its antitrust status." 
Continuing his assault on Kuhn's praise of the fair-minded 
owners who altruistically redesigned the reserve system, Miller 
told the legislators that: 
"What turned things around, of course, was not 
the good will or fairmindedness of the club owners, 
but rather, the Messersmith case. By utilizing 
impartial arbitration, subsequently enforced by 
the courts, the players association obtained the 
ruling that baseball's reserve system was not as 
airtight as the owners had been led to believe. 
• • • Then and only then were the owners first 
189 
interested in modii'ying the reserve system." 
Miller concluded his remarks before Congress by calling for 
our nation's law makers to remove baseball's anomalous exemption 
in order to give baseball players equal protection of the law. 
In again attacking Kuhn's viewpoint, the ex-director of the base-
ball union said: 
"In Kuhn's view baseball is fulfilling its public 
obligations and, ergo, under his logic Congress 
(So) 
has no basis for removing baseball's privileged 
status. Needless to say, that falls far short of 
establishing a basis for special treatment 
accorded to no other unregulated sector of our 
190 
11 
economy. 
Furthermore, Miller criticized the Supreme Court for passing 
the buck to Congress in order to correct an error made by the 
judiciary. Nevertheless, the Court has said tr~t Congress has 
the power to change the status quo, and in ~uller's opinion: 
"that clear invitation should not be ignored. 
The professional baseball player no longer should 
191 
be denied equal protection of the law." 
III. Unanswered Questions 
In summing up this section on baseball's opposing viewpoints, 
there are four main issues for justifYing either a maintenance or 
a removal of this sport's antitrust exemption. 1. Does baseball's 
unique nature and structure justifY its histoD• of monopolistic 
control of the players? 2. Have the owners acted responsibly 
enough to justifY non-application of federal laws? 3. Would an 
application of antitrust statutes be counter-productive to, or 
enhance, the gains made through collective bargaining? And 4. 
Should an equal antitrust status between the professional sports 
be reached through an across-the-board exemption or through the 
removal of baseball's distinct privilege? 
(2.1) 
Section 2.6 -In My Opinion 
I. The Judges Should Judge 
After the Supreme Court announced its refusal to reverse its 
earlier decisions in Flood v. Kuhn, Senator Sam ~rvin, Jr. de-
nounced the judiciary. He said that: 
"Baseball enjoys this exemption because of a 
50 year old decision by the Supreme Court that 
it was not an interstate activity and therefore 
not subject to federal law. The Supreme Court 
. ' could make mistakes '_in 1922 ~ , but obviously 
with teams travelling 3000 miles to play one 
another and with T.V. spanning the nation, the 
notion that baseball is not interstate commerce 
192 
is nonsense." 
I believe that the Supreme Court's "refusal to reexamine prior 
statutory interpretations results in the application of stare 
193 
decisis by each succeeding court to the original r:1istake." Although 
stare decisis is admirable for the stability and consistency it 
gives to judicial decisions, "a judicial unvrillingness to reevaluate 
prior statutory interpretations impedes rather than assists the 
194 
development and refinement of the law." As a result, I totn.lly 
disagree with the Court's strict adherence to stare decisis '.'<'hen 
the justices thenselves recognize their decision as "unrealistic, 
(82) 
195 
inconsistent, or illogical.'' 
As C~ Paul Roger states: 
"Courts are obliged to reach the merits of any 
dispute when feasible to fulfill their role as 
arbitrators of disputes and to ensure the pro-
gression of the law. Courts, by reaching the 
merits, may affirm earlier decisions or inter-
pretations as well as reverse them. But by 
failing to review the merits, • courts 
affirm existing interpretations without regard 
196 
fo!' their worth." 
Likew·ise, I disagree with the judiciary's insistence tl:at 
"if there is any inconsistency or illogic in all of this, it is an 
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied 
197 
by the Cor..gress and not by this Court." 
Since the days of Chief Justice John l1arshall, the Suprer:e 
Court has been recognized as, and prided itself on bein~, the 
final arbiter of our nation's lebal conflicts. :icvrever, by dererring 
to the silent legislators, the j~lstices have rerr.oveu -':"lerr.sel':es 
from their legal responsibilities. As a result: 
"instead of having t1m interdependent bodies 
responsible for i:::prcv::lng and ad,:ancine; stat·..ltor:t 
la';-;-, cn2.y the legislature has r<:>:;ponsibility 
after a cocrrt has once spoken on t:'le sub.ject. 
The judiciary is put ir. the ancrr.alot:s position of 
192 
being U...'1able to ::or::eC!t i ~s o~rn errors a'~ 
(83) 
Organized Baseball has changed dramatically since Federal 
Baseball. Its cames can no longer be described as mere exhibition 
199 
not engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, the Supreme Colrrt 
has been grossly negligent in its responsibility to "adopt a 
philosophy that takes cognizance of the effects that change can 
200 
have on the propriety of pTior statutory interpretations." 
II. The Legislators Should Legislate 
Whereas I disagree vri th the Court's refusal to reexamine 
baseball's exempt status, I also disagree with the legislators' 
inability to respond to the Toalson and Flood decisions which have 
placed the responsibility for reconciling this issue in their hands. 
Unquestionably, professional baseball is a business involved 
in interstate commerce. It also is a business that practices 
various forms of restraint of trade or commerce, monopolistic 
control of its employees, and anticompetitive balancing of teams. 
Therefore, Congress must enact some type of legislation "t:;, include 
this very lucrative business within the mainstream of American 
201 
antitrust legislation." 
Ifuwever, I am in favor of the type of legislative response 
to baseball's antitrust exemption as proposed by Representative 
202 
Horton during the 92nd Congress. It would: place all pro-
fessional sports within the purview of the antitrust laws; make 
the business aspects of professional sports applicable to anti-
trust regulation; yet "e~empt from antitrust exposure those on-
the-field practices which, due to the unique character of these 
(84) 
sports businesses, are necessary for the successful, competitive 
203 
survival of the sports themselves." 
My reasons for removing baseball's exemption, yet allowing 
certain aspects of the industry to be exempt are threefold. First, 
it would place all professional sports on an equal antitrust foot-
ing and thereby make them all accountable to the federal statutes. 
In other words, this type of legislation would remove baseball's 
anomalous antitrust status - by bringing its obvious interstate 
business affairs within the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Second, professional team sports are entirely different 
from other types of businesses. Congress enacted antitrust legis-
lation on the grounds that: 
"the public will be best served by vigorous 
competition between companies so that those that 
are able to give the public the best product at 
204 
the best price will be those that prosper." 
However, when dealing with professional athletics, the public is 
best served when the sports' teams are evenly balanced. Otherwise, 
"it is generally agreed that the wealthier teams would absorb the 
best talent and force the dissolution of the poorer teams and 
205 
of the leagues themselves." 
Third, antitrust laws insist that individual businesses act 
independently of their competitors. "However, professional team 
2o6 
sports must, of necessity, be organized into leagues." As a 
result, they are dependent on one another and must be permitted to 
work together. This type of legislation would recognize the need 
(85) 
for collusion between the te~~s which in the long run benefits the 
public. 
The problem, hm.;ever, with this type of legislative remedy 
to the antitrust conflict, is how to distinguish between the 
business and on-the-field practices. The courts would therefore 
be brought back into the "triangle" as it would be up to the 
judiciary to resume its position as the final arbiter. 
III. The Snorts Triangle 
An analysis of professional sports and the antitrust la1vs, 
with emphasis on baseball's anomalous exemption, sheds new light 
on the "sports triangle." There is no doubt that the courts and 
Congress have been directly involved in, and had a tremendous 
impact on, athletic competition. However, it has not been the 
result of usual judici~ legislative, and athletic actions. As 
Nancy Jean Meissner puts it, "the lower courts have refused to 
act in deference to the Supreme Cotirt; the Supreme Court has refUsed 
to act in deference to implied congressional intent; and Congress 
207 
has refused to act, period." Only those within baseball itself 
have attempted to resolve the inequities associated w~th this 
aberration. 
Lionel s. Sobel summed up this unique representation of the 
"sports triangle 11 when he spoke before the House of Representative's 
Select Committee on Professional Sports. ne said that the terms: 
"anomaly, inconsistency, and illogic are really 
words ·.vhich, in my judgment, understate the sig-
nificance of baseball's exemption, for baseball 
continues to be exempt from the antitrust laws 
only as a result of something which I viev as 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 u.s. 258, 282 
Summary of Justice Blackmun's Opinion of the Court: 
"In view of all this, it seems appropriate now to say that: 
1. Professional baseball is a business and is 
engaged in interstate commerce. 
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption 
from the federal antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very 
distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball 
and Toalson have become an aberration confined to baseball. 
3. Even though others might regard this as 
"unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," see Radovich, 352 
U.S., at 452, the aberration is an established one, and one 
that has been recognized not only in Federal Baseball and 
Toalson, but in Shubert, International Boxing, and Radovich, 
as well, a total of five consecutive cases in this Court. 
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a 
century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit 
of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's 
expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a 
recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique character-
istics and needs. 
4. Other professional sports operating interstate -
football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and 
golf - are not so exempt. 
( 1 06) 
APPENDIX "A" CONTINUED 
5. The advent o~ radio and television, with their 
consequent increased coverage and additional revenues, has 
not occasioned an overruling o~ Federal Baseball and Toalson. 
6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, 
with ~ull and continuing congressional awareness, has been 
allowed to develop and to expand unhindered by ~ederal 
legislative action. Remedial legislation has been introduced 
repeatedly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. The 
Court, accordingly, has concluded that Congress as yet has 
had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the 
reach o~ the antitrust statutes. This, obviously, has been 
deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence 
and passivity. C~. Boys ~~rkets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 u.s. 235, 241-242 (1970). 
7. The Court has expressed concern about the con-
fusion and the retroactivity problems that inevitably would 
result with a judicial overturning of Federal Baseball. It 
has voiced a preference that if any change is to be made, it 
come by legislative action that, by its nature, is only pro-
spective in operation. 
8. The Court noted in Radovich, 352 u.s., at 452, 
that the slate with respect to baseball is not clean. In-
deed, it has not been clean for half a century. 
This emphasis and this concern are still with us. 
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and 
( 1 07) 
APPENDIX "A II CONTllWED 
almost two decades after Toalson, to overturn those cases 
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has 
allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far 
beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced 
a desire not to disapprove them legislatively. 
Accordingly, we adhere once again to Federal 
Baseball and Toalson and to their application to professional 
baseball. We adhere also to International Boxing and Radovich 
and to their respective applications to professional boxing 
and professional football. If there is any inconsistency 
or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic 
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and 
not by this Court. If we were to act otherwise, we would 
be withdra~~ng from the conclusion as to congressional 
intent made in Toalson and from the concerns as to retro-
spectivity therein expressed. Under these circumstances, 
there is merit in consistency even though some might claim 
that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency." 
I 
L__ 
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APPENDIX "B" 
TELL IT TO THE JUDGE 
Major league baseball clubs won 17 of 30 salary arbitration cases this 
year (88 players originally filed; 58 settled before arbitration). 
In arbitration, the judge decides whether the player's demand or 
the team's offer is the fairer salary. 
The Winners 
Player 
Fernando Valenzuela 
.f!lario Soto 
Ron Davis 
Doug Bair 
Damasco Garcia 
Dan Petry 
Tony Pena 
Mookie i'lilson 
Tim Lollar 
Jim Barr 
Rudy Law 
Joe Price 
Bobby Clark 
The Losers 
Player 
Broderick Perkins 
Bruce Berenyi 
Nike Sciascia 
Dave Goltz 
Roy Lee Jackson 
Bobby Castillo 
Bill Sample 
Kirk Gibson 
Aurelio Lopez 
Tony Bernazard 
Bill Gullickson 
Dennis Lamp 
Steve I!ov;e 
Julio Cruz 
Len Barker 
Lonnie Smith 
Pedro Guerrero 
Team 
Dodgers 
Reds 
Twins 
Cardinals 
Blue Jays 
Tigers 
Pirates 
Mets 
Padres 
Giants 
White Sox 
Reds 
Angels 
Team 
Indians 
Reds 
Dodgers 
Angels 
Blue Jays 
1'-vrins 
Rangers 
Tigers 
Tigers 
Hhite Sox 
Expos 
Hhite Sox 
Dodgers 
l1ariners 
Indians 
Cardinals 
Dodgers 
1982 
salary 
$350,000 
$295,000 
$300,000 
$200,000 
$130,000 
$175,000 
$ 72,500 
$ 90,000 
$ 50,000 
$135,000 
$ 37,500 
$ 85,000 
$ 79,000 
1982 
salary 
~ 97,500 
$ 75,000 
$136,500 
$ 33,500 
$ 75,000 
$ 65,000 
$162,500 
$200,000 
$285,000 
~152,000 
$200,000 
$250,000 
$100,000 
$375,000 
$365,000 
$240,000 
$275,000 
Team 
Offer 
$750,000 
$450,000 
$360,000 
$325,000 
$300,000 
$350,000 
$260,000 
$215,000 
$200,000 
$165,000 
$130,000 
$130,000 
$105,000 
Team 
Offer 
$125,000 
$150,000 
$150,COO 
$150,000 
$155,000 
$185,000 
$215,000 
$220,000 
$250,000 
$252.000 
$275:000 
$312,500 
~325,000 
$425,000 
$475,000 
$500,000 $6oo,ooo 
Player 
dertand 
$1,000,000 
$ 625,000 
$ 475,000 
$ 450,000 
$ 4oo,ooo 
$ 390,000 
$ 365,0CO 
$ 325,000 
$ 300,000 
$ 280,000 
-'· 
'i> 220,000 
$ 210,000 
$ 1h;,coo 
Player 
de::Jand 
~185,000 
$22'),000 
$215,0CO 
~320,020 
~225,000 
$350,c:::c 
$300,000 
"-~'?<:; coo 'f,;:,~, 
•'-lc:; '"' '+'j .,,...,co $4oo,coo 
$365,000 
~750,000 
~450,CCO 
$5CO,OCO 
:;i2C5 ,CCC 
$58C,OOO 
$750,000 
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Chapter three 
"Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: 
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Section 3.1 Introduction: 
A. Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics 
Discrimination against women in our nation's educational in-
stitutions became an issue of national concern in the early 1970's. 
The legislators were inundated by numerous groups seeking equal apport-
unity for women with regard to admissions policies, employment practices, 
financial aid, and treatment in extracurricular programs. Dmllile and 
Sandler, who did extensive research in the area of sex discrimination 
in educational institutions, summed up the attitudes of those seeking 
equal opportunities for women: 
"Di:'ferential treatment of men and '..romen 
exists in almost every segment and aspect 
of our society. Perhaps it is most d~ag­
ing, however, when it appears and is trans-
mitted by the educational institutions which 
are supposed to provide all citizens with the 
tools to live in a democracy. In the past 
twenty years, it has become painfully clear 
that equal eaucational opportunity .,Till be-
come a reality only if it is suppcrted by 
strong an~ vigorously enforced Federal legis-
lation." 
2 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of ~972 was i~te~ded to be 
that Federal legislation which would curb sex discr~mination ~n education-
al institutions. Specifically, Title IX provides that: 
"no person shall, or: ':he basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subject to 
discriminatior: under any educati·::m pro-
gram 0r activity receivir..g federal fina.n-
cic.l assistance. ''3 (see Appendix I) 
The history -::J:~ I'i tle IX reveals that C:ongress mode2.t!d the at'Jve 
prohibits discri~ir:~tion Qn th2 tasis of race, color, or ~ational origin 
L. 
(111) 
?"...o1·reyer, the ccmtrovers;; iThich has embroileci Title IX :::~or the past 
decn.ce i.:> that 1mlike Title TI. -;;hic:1 i.s applied i~:.sti t-:.<ti:n:.-v;ide, ~;any 
fee:'.. that :'i tle IX "is lini ted in its coverage t.:J euucatior:al in-
stitutior:s, particularly (ar:.d, sane ·,muld say, excJ_usi·;el:-) to th.:Jse 
5 
educational pl~~grans or actiYities ':orhich receive federal funding." 
As a result, it is uncer~::l.ir: ~·~hether specific programs l<hich do :10t 
t:1e:::.;:;elves receixe federal assistance are ::ffected by l'it.le :~:·: · .. rher: 
other pr8::;r3.!ns at the col:!_ege or university receive such f:J~1dint;. 
1974 '\·Then it ~-ras announced that specific pr.:Jgrarr:c, suc:1 as ir:"Sercollc;-
'J 
iate athletics, r:rere explicitly included in the Title IX l'e.s·llations. 
The follovli:1g year, the Department of Health, Education, and llelfare 
(HE'w) issued its Title IX implementing regulations. fdhile HE.W was 
specific in its scope of Title IX's anti-discrimir.atory provisions and 
warned that failure to comply could result in an institution's loss of 
federal fu.'1ds, "the schools and universities argued that tile:i :;e:=ded a 
more detailed explanation of 1·rhat the £Overnment would con::;icier corr:pliance 
7 
-..n_ th the ::..aw." In 1979, ~d responded to these requests and listed in 
its final policy interpretati.:Jns guidelines for ~itle IX's coverage of 
athletics. (See Appendix II) 
i•;ark A.. Kadzielski says that "the repercussions of ~he HEH 
regulati~ns under Title IX • have been felt most keenly by institutions 
c 
v 
of higher education in the area of athletics." ~·lhi:!..e these reg,..:.ls.tions 
caught many athletic directors by surprise and for the ~ost part have b2en 
extrer.:ely unpopular, "changes, both significant and cosr.1~tic, have 'Jeen 
0 
/ 
r.1ade in athletic programs at postsecondary instituions." 
Title IX has had its ~ost significant impact in intercollegiate 
-------------
(ll2) 
athletic departments in the area of women's athletics. Almost ever<J 
college athletic program has experienced vast increases in the number of 
women participating, the number of sports offered for 1<1omen, the amotmt 
of money available to these programs, and the salaries for female coaches. 
(See Appendices III and IV) 
In addition, the number of scholarships available to female ath-
letes has gone up. This is due to the fact that "according to Title IX, 
scholarship ~oney for the men's and women's programs, theoreti~ally, 
should be awarded on a proportional basis according to the number of 
11 
athletes in each program." Before Title IX, no college or '.mi ver zi ty 
offered atluetic scholarships to women. Yet in 1975, 5000 were offered 
12 
and in 1980, 10,000 athletic grant in aids were awarded to ''mmen. 
Although there continues to be large disparities in total budgets, 
coaches' salaries, and scholarships, women's athletics have tmdergone a 
revolution in the past decade and Title IX can be viewed as its impetus. 
However, it remains to be seen whether women's athletics will ever reach 
parity with the men's programs or if in fact future interpretations of 
Title IX will reverse its applicability to specific programs thereby 
nullifying the advances made by women in intercollegiate athletics. 
One corollary to the advances made in women's athletics as a result 
of Title IX's emphasis on proportional equality, is ~hat men's non-revenue 
producing sports have frequently suffered from the redistribution of 
budgetary and scholarship funds to the women's programs. As a result of 
athletic departments being forced to upgrade the funds allocated to 
women's programs while generally not being reimbursed in an equal amount 
by the respective boards of trustees, reductions have to te made in other 
programs. These programs are rarely football and basketball, and instead 
10 
(113) 
are such non-revenue producing sports as golf, wrestling, and swimming. 
B. The Sports Triangle 
In the past decade judicial litigation, arising out of the anti-
),. 
(F'' 
sex discrimination legislation known as Title IX, has had a prepondereus 
~ffect o~ American athletics. No longer is it permissible to relegate 
women's athletics to second-rate status. However, t~e judicial and legis-
lative branches have been inconsistent and often times in conflict with 
regard to the scope of Title IX's application to educational programs in 
general, and intercollegiate athletics in specific. 
The judiciary has been faced with the question of whether Congress 
intended Title IX to be applied institutionally or only to the specific 
programs that receive direct federal assistance. In North Haven Board of 
13 
Education v. Bell the Supreme Court rejected the institutional inter-
pretation. However, the Supreme Court is presently deciding on a case, 
Grove City College v. Bell, in which a lower court ruled in favor of the 
14 
institutional scope. 
Likewise, there have been conflicting interpretations as to 
Congress' intentions with regard to this issue. There are some co~gress-
15 
men, like Senator Birch Bayh who believe that rlliW's institutional appli-
cation includes all educational programs as being within the purview of 
Title IX and is in line vlith the original congressional intent. However, 
there are others who disagree. Senator Jesse r~~s, in fact, says that 
HEW's regulations: 
"are far in excess of the goal of insuring an 
equal educational opportunity for ~e~bers of 
both se;:es, and they go f:::.r beyond t~e i!ltent :.6 
of Congress as expressed in that legi:::lation. •• 
L_ - -------------------------
(114) 
Although it is still undetermined whether Title IX will continue 
to be applied to such programs as intercollegiate athletics which do not 
receive direct federal funding, Congress and the c::mrts have had a majcr 
impact in the revolution occurring in women's athletics. In addition, 
whereas Title IX is at the root of this revolution and can be hailed 
17 
"as a long overdue opportunity to alleviate discriminatory practices" , 
it has also had the negative affect of reducing the funds allocated to 
men's non-revenue producing sports. 
The sports triangle is in the midst of a critical year with 
regard to defining the scope of Title IX's application to intercollegiate 
athletics. The Grove City decision which should be handed down in early 
1984 and the inevitable congressional response could result in a dramatic 
restructuring of intercollegiate athletics. As summed up by r~dzielski: 
Section 3.2 
"no one is yet sure of the extent to which 
changes are mandated by the regulations. Pend-
ing lawsuits and proposed HE'Vl interpretive 
guidelines will serve to shape the parameters 
of Title IX's real l~pact on intercollegiate 
athletic programs." 
Inconsistent Judicial InterPretations: 
In the early 1970's, the judiciary became hea·rily involved in 
litigation involving sex discrimination. Cases were tried, in this 
area, primarily on the contention that certain rights g~aranteed by 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. 
~wever, vri th the advent of Title IX, "whose avowed purpose is the elim-
ination of sex discrimination in education," women had another avenue 
19 
to achieve equality in athletic opportunity. 
While the courts are receptive to trJ cases arising both out of 
(115) 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, they have been extremely inconsist-
ent in their interpretations of these laws. (For a summary of the lit-
igation arising out of Title IX, see Appendix V) 
This judicial inconsistency has been most evident in the five 
most recent Title IX cases. Specifically, the courts have been unable 
to produce a consistent conclusion as to the scope of Title IX's appli-
cati~n to educati~nal programs: 
"Some courts have used an institutional approach, 
applying Title IX to any program in an institution 
receiving federal aid; other courts have taken 
a programmatic approach, limiting Title IX ~8 
individual programs receiving federal aid." 
21 
In Bennett v. ~-lest Texas State Universit;z, six female students who 
participated in the school's intercollegiate athletic program brought 
a class action suit against the University contending that certain policies 
22 
and practices violated Title IX. "The school argued that its athletic 
program received no direct federal financial assistance and thus was not 
23 
subject to Title IX regulations." 
The Texas district court held that Title IX is programmatic in 
scope and, therefore, only those programs or activities specifically 
receiving financial assi3tance fall within the ambit of this legislation. 
This ruling is similar to that issued by the 1-1ichit;an distric·t court in 
25 
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board. In addition, the court denied the 
plaintiff's claim that the University's athletic department was the 
::.ndirect beneficiary of federal financial aid. "In so doing, it rejected 
the argument that indirect benefits to an athletic program may bring it 
26 
w·ithin Title IX." 
Justice R0bert H. ?orter, in his summary ,jud.;ment f:;r the court, 
24 
(116) 
made a definitive justification for interpreting Title IX programmatically: 
"The precise selection of the terms 'programs' and 
'recipient' throughout the various sections of 
Title IX evidence the clear intent of Congress 
that Sections 1681 and 1682 and the regulations 
thereunder apply only to specific programs or 
activities which receive direct financial 
assistance. "2r( 
In ruling that the federal aid must be directly allocated to the 
program in question, Justice Porter emphasized that: 
"In order for the strictures of Title IX to be 
triggered, the federal financial assistance must 
be direct. The type of indirect aid 
receivedby the university athletic progr~does not 
bring them within the ambit of Title IX." 
A couple months after Bennett ·~s decided, a similar case arose 
in Pennsylvania. In Hoffer v. Temple University~9 women students alleged 
tr~t the school discriminated against female athletes as regulated by 
Title IX. The university contended that its intercol:cgiate athletic 
program was exempt from application of this statute since it received no 
30 
federal funds earmarked for that program. 
The F~ffer court ruled in direct contrast to the decisions handed 
out in Othen and Bennett. "Adopting the institutional interpretation 
of the legislative history of Title IX", this district court held that 
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in all programs at an educational 
31 
institution when that school receives federal funds. 
Chief Judge Jaseph S. Lord, III, held that civil rights statutes, 
such as Title IX, are entitled to braad interpretatians in order ta 
32 
facilitate their remedial purposes. As a result, the court based its 
institutional decision on an expansive reading cf the phrase 
33 
federal financial assistance" in Ti~le IX. 
'~ . . recelv::..ng 
Th~ U. s. Supre~e Co~~ ~irst considered the scope of Title :x 
(117) 
34 
in 1982. North Paven Board of Education v. Bell dealt with a sex dis-
cri~ination case involving employment practices within an educational 
institution. In addition to governing athletics, Title IX contains em-
plo~~ent regulations. The plaintiffs, however, filed suit seeking to 
invalidate alleged discriminatory hiring practices as covered under 
35 
Title IX. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the language of Title IX as being 
program-specific, although the opinion of the court did not examine the 
legislative histo~J of this statute in determining its progra~-specific 
36 
scope. "Furthermore, the North ?aven court upheld lEi:' s regcla tions 
as consistent with the program-specific scope of Title IX and -:hus 
37 
found the regulations valid." 
~·lhile the Supreme Court was definitive in its interpretat:.cr: of 
7itle IX as being program-specific with reeard to employmeGt ciiscri~in-
ation, there exists Q~certainties as to the decision's effest on Title 
-c 
.)v 
IX in other areas, specifically intercollegiate athlet:.cs. ·rnis is ~he 
r·2sult of the North Haven court's failure to define the teYZl 
7he apparent prograrr.-specific int.erpretatior: 
si;r::.fica;-,+; (!ffects or, +.:-:e Virginia distr:.c~ cm;.rt '::; :c.:.:in,_; -- :·,,~ ·.;•::rsi ':..;,· 
~':) 
..J./ 
its at.~l·~~~.c denart::1~r:t 
!+o 
direct feder:1l •-.r, .. .; ..,.!..o;:.Y'!,...O -v ..... -- ......... .~,._,_ • 
(118) 
p!'ogr:tm-specific interpretatio::-1 of Title IX. Thus, the district court 
ruled that the "defenda::.ts have failed entirely t::> estatlish a nexus 
between federal financial assistance and the athletic program at 
l.Q 
(Richmond)." 
Finally, the Richmond court rejected the benefit theory as es-
pause~ by the DOE, Citing Othen and Bennett as preceuents, the district 
court denied the contention that the athletic department comes \nthin the 
jurisdiction of Title IX simply because it "benefits from various funds 
which are recei veci by the university en other programs •,rhich in tCU"n 
u3 
release university funds to be used in the athletic department." 
Despite the Richmond cot~t's rejection of both the benefit theory 
and the institutional interpretation, the 3rd circuit court embraced them 
"as a means of bringing under Title IX's guidelines programs that do not 
44 45 
directl;{ receive federal funds." In Grove City Collega v. Bell, the 
judicial branch proved just how inconsistently it can interpret Title IX. 
While the 3rd circ'..lit court acl-'"~'1owledged that iiorth Eaven inter-
preted the sex discrimination statute in question as being program-specific 
in ~ts scope of application, it adopted an institutional approach in 
defining the concept of program: 
"vie concede, as ·.-1e nust, that Title IX'c pro·risions, 
on their face, are program-specific. ~·le cannot a;;ree, 
however, that Congress intended to limit the purpose 
and op:=ra tion of Title IX by a nar!'ovl and illogical 
ir:terpre+;ation of its program-specifi-::: pro·;i.sicns. 
Rather, we believe that Congress intended that full 
scope be given to the non-discrir:ri.natory purpose 
that Title IX •ras enacted to achieve, and that the 
frogram-specific terms of Title IX must therefore 
be construed realistically and flexibly. By so 
doing, •• , cor:1plete accomodation can be achieved 
between the concepts of 'indirect federal financifrl 
assistance' and 'progran-specific' requirer.1ents." 0 
(119) 
The GroYe City court also decided that when an academic institution 
receives federal funds, each program within that institution indirectly 
benefits from the assistance. As a result, all programs within the 
47 . 
school must comply with Title IX's regulations. As a result, the 3rd 
circuit court ruled that "when the federal government furnishes indirect 
or general aid to an institution, the institution must be the 'program' 
48 
referred to in Title IX." In other words, the Grove City court rational-
ized that the Supreme Court actually adopted an institutional approach to 
49 
the term "program" which gives credence to the benefit theory. 
While the Grove City case is pending in the U. s. Supreme·Court, 
it is not known if the justices are going to decide on the specific 
question of whether Title IX covers all programs at an institution receiv-
ing financial assistance or only those specific programs directly aided. 
If, though, the Supreme Court rules definitively on this matter, it could 
restructure college athletics and end the judicial inconsistencies that 
have marred Title IX litigation. 
Until our nation's highest court hands down such a decision, the 
words of Kevin A. Nelson will continue to define the situation which 
confronts the judiciary: 
"The diametrically opposing deci:::;ions of +.he 
district court in University of Richmond and the 
Third Circuit in Grove City and Hoffer ~eflect 
the confusion surrounding Title IX and the lavr's 
applicability to collegiate athletic programs. 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to issue a compre-
hensive decision that ·,rill de:'ine the scope of 
Title IX in all areas has resulted in an in-
consistent application of the la'I>T to athletic 
programs. Although the Universit;r of Rich.':lond 
court ruled that iior+;h :ra:ren eli::ri.nated 'l':..tle 
IX's applicability +;c athletic departments, 
the r;.0ffer (and G~ove Cit;r) decisions p~esent 
valid argureents for the prohibition of gender 
discrimination in collegiate athletics."50 
(120) 
Section 3.3 Conflicting Congressional Intentions: 
In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 for the purpose of prohibiting gender discrimination in education-
al programs that receive federal financial assistance. While this is an 
obvious statement of congressional intent, it is not at all obvious if 
our nation's legislators intended the statute to apply to educational 
programs, specifically intercollegiate athletics, when the programs are 
not the direct beneficiaries of federal aid. 
Ttis inconclusiveness with regard to congressional intent is pri-
marily due to the fact that Title IX ,.,as ushered into law without adEquate 
public hearings. In the House, it was made a part of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972 in the full Committee on Education and Labor, rather 
than working its way through one of the subcommittees. As a result, it 
51 
was not debated in public hearings. Likewi~e, the Senate adopted Title 
52 
IX without benefit of the subcommittee or hearing process. As Jesse 
Helms notes: 
11
:10 adequate record of the legislative intent 
of Title IX exists. Senators, Representatives, 
and bureaucrats alike must vie,., and co53true 
this legislation in a virt'l..lZl.l vacuum." 
While there is inconclusive proof as to Cocgress' intent in 1972 
in applying Title IX either institutionally or on a prograr:1-specific scope, 
there are proponents of both interpretations. In attempting to analyze the 
two sides to this controversy over congressional intent, specifically as 
it pertains to Title IX's application to intercollegiate athletics, this 
-" \ 
-.. 1.· ~ 
section takes three approaches: lst. ; It analyzes, retrospectively, the 
attitudes and activities ~f the me~bers of Congress at the time of Title 
IX's implementation; 2nd. It explains the Departmer.t of nealth, Education, 
(121) 
and Welfare's (~)-T~l~cy interpretations as 
it elicited; and ~r~.· It describes the types 
well as the responses that 
of legislative amendments 
to Title IX that have been sponsored since the HEW's 1979 final policy 
interpretations. 
A. Congressional Intentions: The Early 1970's 
Newspaper columnist Judy l~nn wrote in a recent article: 
"Thirty-seven words written into legislation 
more than 10 years ago are about to reopen 
an explosive argument over what Congress 
intended when it passed the law forbidding 
sex discrimiUation in federally subsidized 
education."5 
In attempting to analyze the controversy over whether Congress 
intended Title IX to be applied institution-wide or on a program-specific 
basis, it is important to begin with a recapitulation of the events lead-
ing up to passage of the Education Amendments of 1972. 
The Nixon administration, in 1971, proposed a gender dizcrimination 
amendment "which would have applied across the board to all programs or 
55 
activities operated by a recipient of federal assistance." This was 
supported by Senator Birch Bayh, who introduced an amendment to the 
56 
Higher Education Bill of 1971. When introduci~g hi3 amendreent, Senator 
Bayh remarked: 
". • • as we seek to help thoze •,.;he have been the 
victims of economic discrL~nation, let us not 
forget those Americans who have been subject to 
other ~ore subtle but still pernicious forms of 
discrimination. • • • Today I am s11bmi tting an amend-
ment to this bill •. ,.hich will guarantee that wonen, 
too, enjoy the educa1ional opportunity every 
American deserves.")' 
'tlhile the 1971 Bayh proposal was not passed, it is significant 
to note that it •ms undoubtedly institutional in its applicability to 
(122) 
educational institutions. In additi~n, it did not apply to private 
institutions: 
"No person in the United States shall, on ~he 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of or be subject 
to discrimination under any program or 
activity conducted by a public institution 
of higher education which is a recipient of 
federal financial assistangs for any education 
program or activity ••• 11 
The district court in University of Richmond v. Bell, emphasized 
the fact that Bayh's 1971 amendment was struck down by Congress in 
issuing its program-specific ruling: 
"In essence the (Department of Education's) 
'benefits' and 'injections' theories are but 
theories, or arguments, that Congress should 
not have rejected the initial institutional 
approach introduced by Senator Bayh. I~wever, 
Congress did reject that approach and that 
should have been the end of it."59 
On February 28, 1972, Senator Bayh introduced an altered •rersion 
of his 1971 amendment. This proposal was clearly program-specific since 
it only prohibited the actual educational programs or activities receiving 
60 
federal funds. 
Nonetheless, the federal government, in its brief submitted to the 
Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell, argues that the c~~nge 3en~tor 
Bayh made in his amendment was not intended to narrow the scope of the 
sex discrimination re~~ationc in educational institutions. It is their 
contention that any other conclusion would run coun~er to Bayh's intention 
61 
to eradicate gender discri~nation. 
Senator Eayh agrees ~nth these statements. In hearings held in 
1975 before the Ho~e Subcommittee on Fos~secondarJ Education, he ctated 
that it is incorrect to interpret the cha!1ges in language that he :nacie in 
(123) 
sponsoring Title IX as being more narrow in its application of this 
statute to regulate only the particular programs receiving federal 
assistance: 
"In maintaining that the proper Congressional 
intent was the narrow definition of program, 
the critics are making the assumption that 
the scope of Title IX ••• (is) distinct from 
those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 • • .6This assumption is totally in-accurate." 2 
Senator Bayh is not the only one w·ho believes that althoU£;h the 
language of Title IX appears to be program-specific, the intent of 
Congress w~s to apply this statute to all programs at a federally funded 
educational institution. In fact, 50 members of Congress filed an amicus 
brief to the Supreme Court in the current Grove City 8ollege case. It 
is their contention that Congress intended to: 
''prchibi t gender discrimination in all aspects of 
the American educational system, to include 
entire institutions where students reg~ive 
federally i'und~d tuition assistance." 5 
Vihile the 1975 remarks of Senator Bayh and the recent contention 
by 50 congressmen that Congress, in 1972, intended to apply Ti!::le IX :.r.-
::; ::i t11tionally o.re :1ote1-rorthy, ttey do not carry much legal vreight. :'his 
is d·1c to the fact that alth~ngh such post-er:actr:ent remarks proTide 
"additional evidence", the !:iupre!!'.e Conrt !:las con::.:::te!i.tly r'Jlecl t~a':. po~t-
enaci:;::!e!;t re:::arY.s cr eve:1ts ''are unreli:1ble guides te> :c:-ngress:_or:a.:.. 
:.:-: :.ent. '' 
--~--· .... ..-:,.-.-. 
-J _,.,ac:..- .__..; 
(l24) 
subseq~-~cnt t8 its passa;e :.s :-:t:ch clea=er. 
m.1.:nero·.u: responses to t::.c :Zd policy interpretatio;~s. 
~ec"::,e:.l .ss·:e:::.·al pr::>p:~sals ~·i~ic:" · .. :cuLl :"ave 0Xe[;:ptec :1':l:.let::.:: ~::.;;,art:.:e::ts 
66 
t~e i~d to publi:h policy interpretations regarding the inple~~ntation of 
I'i tle IX and include reasonable pro·.risions to brine; intercollegiate c:.thle'::ic 
67 
acti V:. ties '\vi thin the p1trview of this statute. noted by ':'honas A. 
Cox: 
"F!'om the process by ~vhicl: these matters ~vere 
considered, it seems !'easonable to conclude 
that by 1974, Congress agreed that Title IX 
applied to inte!'collec;iate sports and sought 
to assure only that6~ regulate with particular 
care in this area." 
The first policy interpretation issued by ?.2'-'l, "'l':1e -:'i tle IX 
69 
Regulations", beca'!le effective en July 25, 1975. It contair.•~d a three 
year moratoritun on its application and s-:.1bsequent enforc~me::t ·,rith rega!'d 
70 
to intercollegiate athletic programs. This polic::,r statement is extrer.:e-
ly significant because !{EH interpreted "progrN:Js" ':hat q':.lalify as recei·r-
i:1g federal aid in the broad, institutional scope. irEd .:tated that a 
program '';·rill be subject to the !'equirenent::; of (the -::::. ~le :=:<) l'Cf.Stllation 
7l 
i:' it recei'res or benefits frorr: (federal financial) assistance." 
tinder :illd' s "oenefi ting" appr~ac!J., ':i tle IX applies :o intercolle6-
iate athletic prograr.;s irregardless o:~ ~·;!::ether or :;.ot it receives direct 
72 
federal f',:.::ding. A::; long ~s any progra~ or ac~ivity an educatior,al 
institution receives :'ederal aid, the athletic dc~ar~~ent is ~ulpable to 
(125) 
this legislation's regulations. 
Hr.."'Yl' s 1975 regulations also called for "equity for men and i·romen 
athletes in scholarships, equipment, facilities, coaching and other 
73 
CQmponents of sports programs." Such broad interpretations of the 
original legislation is also significant since Congress refused to in-
validate them in the face of ang17 responses from those involved Hith 
74 
intercollegiate athletics. 
John A. Fuzak, President of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, argued before a congressional subco~ittee that ~d's 
regulations are inconsistent with the provisions of Title IX: 
"I have read both Title IX and the HEW regulations, 
and if I may be permitted to say so, I find in-
credible disparities - in plain English - beti.;reen 
what Title IX a75ually says and what HEW says 
Title IX says." 
The focal point of his argument is that Title IX is to applied 
to any program or activity that receives federal assistance. However, 
intercollegiate athletic programs are not the recipients of aid from 
76 
the federal government. As a result, he is unable to .justi.f-J how iilltl 
ca.."l expand "the literal language of Title IX, to cover not only education 
programs 'ilhich receive federal assistance, but also those ":vhic!-< benefit 
11 
from th?. t assistance." 
Furthermore, he co :te::1ds that vrhile Title IX is designed to be a 
prohibition of gender discricination, j[£J;-l has converted it into an a:::':'im-
ative requirement cf social action: 
"If Congress wants to write or mandate such a social 
action program, it can ~urely do so to the extent 
permitted by our Constitution, but •,re submit :nest 
urgently that such a program i18not consistent Hith the stat'J.te now on the books." 
h.lthough Congress, as a ;.;rhcle, supported the HE'd !'egulations, there 
(126) 
were members who opposed the departmental interpretations. Representative 
Ronald Mottl even went so far as to say that "the bureaucrats in IIDI are 
79 
all wet on this proposal." While he claims to be in favor of sex dis-
crimination and equal opportunities for women in our educational instit~tions, 
80 
"this is not the way to go about it." 
In the Senate, Jesse Helms led the opposition to the HLIN's 1975 
regulations. He said that the regulations published by ~~ bear little 
resemblance to Title IX: 
"Through overbroad interpretation inconsistent 
with the congressional enactment, HEW has ex-
tended the meaning of the term 'education' to 
embrace programs, activities, and services 
which are not actually part of the educational 
curriculum, such as athle~lcs, student housing, 
medical care, etcetera." 
He was also opposed to HEW's inclusion of a benefit theory since 
it brings within the coverage of Title IX programs or activites which do 
not receive direct federal assistance: 
"Thus, the Department has made vague that which 
was precise, and with the nebulous legal environ-
~ent that it has intentionally created, the 
Department now has the latitude to arbitrarily 
dictate 'law' that will a.£fect every schoolchi2..d 
and student in America."u 
However, Caspar Td. 'deinbcrger, who was SccretarJ of i-IEH at the 
time of its 1975 regulations, refuted the statements ~ade by those in 
opposition to its broad interpretations. :Ie said that the i-Z.l rcGulatic:1s 
23 
encar:.pass only "those matters He ~·rere advised the Conf;res.:; included.'' 
In add.i tion, 'r'leinberger justified his department's interpretations as 
24 
being consistent 1-Tith Title IX, Title VI, and the Javitts' !1.mendment. 
Due to pressures exerted upon the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and 
iiE'i'l "oy the tmi ver::;i ties and col:e;::;cs, n. ne•.: .set of c;·..!ic.:elines '.·Jere iss~ed 
(l27) 
85 
for public co~ent in Dece~ber of 1978. Due to controversies over the 
86 
drafted version, they were not implemented until December 11, 1979. 
'I'he final policy interpretations issued by HEW again institutionally 
apply Title IX to college athletic programs. However, it does acknowledge 
the historical emphasis on male intercollegiate sports, and therefore in-
87 
eludes a two-stage approach to compliance and affirmance. 
The goal of the first stage is to eliminate gender discrimination 
in intercollegiate athletics. It requires the allocation of "substantially 
88 
equal average per capita funds" to participating male and female athletes. 
In lieu of college football's unique status with regard to number of 
participants and cost of funding a team, HEW provides collegiate athletic 
departments with a loophole: 
" ••• discrepancies in average per capita expend-
itures for males and females will not be consider-
ed a violation of Title IX if the institution can 
sho-vr the differences are due to 'non discriminatory 
factors' such as the nas~e or level of competition 
of a particular sport." ';} 
The second stage requires schools to continue affiroative steps 
to encourage the growth of women's athletic programs. In addition, ed-
11cational institutions are to eliminate the discriminatorJ effects of the 
90 
historic emphasis on men's athletics -vrithin a "reasonable time". 
Specifically, the final :ID·l policy interpretations set forth a new 
statement respecting the scope of Title IX's covera6c. It addresses the 
areas of athletic financial assistance and other athletic benefits and 
01 
.;-
opportunities. 
~lith respect to athletic financial assistance, ;m...' will determine 
conpliance in regard to scholarship aid in accordance with the total 
financial aid provided to male and female athletes: 
(128) 
"Neither a proportionate number of scholarships 
nor individual scholarships of equal dollar 
value are required. Rather, the total amount 
of scholarship aid must be substantially P§~­
portionate to participation rates by sex." 
In evaluating the area of other athletic benefits and opportunities, 
HEW bases compliance on a number of non-financially measurable factors. 
These range from travel and per diem expenses, to provisions of housing 
and dining services and facilities. (For a complete listing of benefits 
required in HEW's 1979 final policy interpretations, as well as the 
complete wording of the section relating to intercollegiate athletics, 
see Appendix II). 
As with ~d's requirement of proportionate rates of athletic fin-
ancial assistance, identical benefits and opportunities are not required. 
However, the overall effect of any differences in the treatment of male 
93 
and female athletes must be negligible. 
While the goal of HEW's 1979 interpretations was to clari~J its 
regulations in conjunction with the Title IX's application to athletics, 
it failed in many "rays. As a result of its often vague and azbiguous 
language, "it likely confused inctitutions as to their responsibilities 
94 
ar.d obligations under Title IX as much as it guided them." 
Tom Hansen, assistant executive director of the :lc,\A, echoes the 
less than enthusiast~c response by t~ose representing educational in-
sti tutions. He characterizes r"..i..W' s 1979 policies as, "q•.1ite der..andine;, 
95 
quite complicated, and difficult to administer because of their complexity." 
In addition, he is especially disturbed by the scholarship provi.sion be-
96 
cause it fails to "take account of ability." Or, as '::'homas .J. Flyr;are, 
the author of nucerous :1rticles on ::litle IX, ~tates: 
(129) 
I 
"It does not appear that this proposed policy 
interpretation clears up any of the difficult 
questions that have existed since Title IX 
was enacted."97 
Although the final policy interpretations issued in 1979 by HEW 
still contain ambiguous and confusing provisions, it does offer more 
98 
clarity and guidance than the HEW's earlier regulations. \'llmt is most 
significant about the two policy interpretations, is that they represent 
the efforts of a departmental agency to impose a regulatory bridle over 
99 
the previously unregulated programs involved in intercollegiate athletics. 
In addition, while HE.W's final interpretations concede certain accorr.mocations 
to revenue producing sports, it maintains strong concerns OP- behalf of anti-
discriminatory groups: 
"Whether the overall effect of this balancing 
act has been to tip the scales in favor of 
the interests of the status quo over those of100 
change, only time and enforcement will tell." 
C. Congressional Intentions: The Early 1980's. 
vfuile debate continues over specific provisions of the final HZd 
regulations, the controversy surrounding Title IX persis~s on a mere 
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basic point: should intercollegiate athletics be co•r-:?red by Title IX? 
As noted, the legislative history of Title IX is inconsistent and in-
conclusive. Hoi.;ever, an analysis of the las:. three ~·ears demonstrates 11 
Gradual hardening of congressional attitudes that Tit:e IX even if not 
intended ~o in 1972 should novr be made applicable to all educational 
programs 0:1 an institution-Hide bn.sis. 
IP- l98l, three separate bills .,.,ere in Cc::gress dealint; '-rith r:;:'itle 
IX. All three ',·rere concerned ~·ri th narrowing the scope of it.:; c..ppli-::aticn, 
especi3.lly ~d -'::h rec;ard to ccllec;e a.t:-Letics. It is ~ote• . .;orth~,.- that all 
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lC2 
Senator Orrin Eatch introduced the first bill ~rhich directly 
attacked HE'tl' s insti tut:i.onal interpretations. Under his proposal, Title 
IX would be: 
l) narrowly defined in order to exclude student 
financial aid from the definit:..cn of feder:J.l 
assistance. 
2) limited in its scope of protection tc st~dents. 
3) 2.imited in its coverage to only those sp~~~fic 
programs direct2.y receiYir.g feclcr:1l aid • .Lu.::, 
This proposal 1.;as str·.cc:<:: clmm because :.. t ;.;oulj :1ave lef~ fac·.:.2.ty, 
-rl. 
..:...l._'l-:-
staff, an.:: adrninistrators vu.lner:J.ble ~o 3ende!' G.ic:cri!llnati'Jll. In 
addition, ~::mgres::;r.J.e!1 1-lere c::mcerned that Title r.Y'I")("t .... ~ 0~, "": , .. 
..t:J• _._ J..l... --·- -:J 
This J.E to c-ont 0f 
scho~l budgets cor::c :'ra::1 :'edern.l .sources, 
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"! .... ,. r 
·- u 
:=r: that s:.l!:::e c-:Jngre~sianC!.l ~Ession, Ser:. tor 1·Js~r !·::~:::~!'"! :tn~ 
lo6 
~roci'tlced the ?ar;.il::,r ?-~·stecticn Act. 
lC':' 
\ 
/ . 
::·.::.t.,r.::y::li!-:.e ... ::~~.:...~,!~"': .. 
., r-0 
..:...·v•, 
_prc::posa:Ls 
The third bill i!1-:er.ded t~ a..l~er ?itle ::·:'3 .;:.,pplica-::.r;;:-;. ~·.:-~3 cc-
lOJ 
s_p::n;s::Jred b::,· Se.::a'-.or 3d-.;-;arcl Z0rins~J and Se:1atar ::a~c:h. I: ~:;.:led :':Jr 
------------------------- ------- ---------------------------------
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irregardless ~f •,rhether OCR found the school in vi.ola+,ion. In add~.ticr~, 
OCR's budget 1-rould not have been increased in order to reimburse these 
schools, thereby decreasing the amount of money OCR 1rould have to spen<.: 
llO 
far ather ~~ti-diEcriminatorJ actians. 
In lieu of these Congressional rejections of bills intended to 
narrow Title I:X's application, it can he arGued that Concress bec;an 
leaning toward a broader interpretation of Title IX. Coupled >rith ~he 
legislative branch's refuscl to negate the institutianal policy inter-
pretations issued in 1979 by !1.Ed, it is even more apparent that Cone;ress 
presently intends Title IX to apply to a~l programs at a federally assisted 
institution. 
'I'his is especially eYident in the congressional rcsp-:mse to the 
Reagan administration's pasition with respect to this statute. Becirilling 
in August, 1981, the Presidential Task Force on RegulatorJ ~elief announced 
that it will review the HEVl policy interpretations vrith respect to inter-
111 
collegiate athletics. Claiming "over.vhelming" public support, for its 
reviei-T of the Title IX athletic policies, the task force has beg:m te> 
112 
consider the repeal of the intercolle8iate at!uetic regtliations. 
In additi·:m, on August 1, 1983, ?resident 3.ea~;an re~.arked t::at he 
was col!L'!litted to "assure that e·rery ;roman has an equal opp0rtunity to 
ll3 
achieve the American dream." fiowever, four days ::i.ater, his adn:inistratio:1 
petitioned the Supreme Sourt in the pending Grave City College case to 
decide only that the financial aid department at this callec;e is c0vered 
by Title IX. In other words, Title IX should be interpreted on a pragr~-
specific basis. 
This has raised the i:::e of 1-mnen' s groups and se:1t a collective 
sh•.1ci.ci.er through the hal2..s of Congress. As Representative Cla·.1dine Schneider, 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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who immediately submitted a brier to the Supreme Court contrary to the 
Reagan administration's position, says: 
"Congress intended in its wording to prohibit 
gender discrimination in all aspects of 
the American educational system, to include 
entire institutions where students receive 
federally funded tuition assistance. • •• 
Unless a class was directly funded by the 
government, and that is rare, you cotud ll4 
exclude women or give preference to men." 
On November 16, 1983, Congress wrote its most recent passage in the 
turbulent legislative history of Title IX. Repudiating the Reagan ad-
ministration, the House approved Representative Schneider's resolution 
granting the broadest possible application of Title IX. The resolution 
expresses the sense of the House that Title IX "not be amended or altered 
in any manner which 1-rill lessen comprehensive coverage" of equal opportunities 
115 
for females in education. 
While the early legislative history of Title IX suggests that Con-
gress originally intended it to be program-specific, illiW's policy inter-
pretations and the subsequent congressional actions denote that the legis-
lators presently propose this statute to be applied institutionally. The 
impact that an institutional application of Title IX a:1d its policy reg-
ulations ;muld have on intercol2.egiate athletics is bmfold. l•iost ob·rious-
ly, it would continue and, in fact, increase the gro~·rth in •,ramen 's 
athletics. :tovreYer, it could also have a detrimental eff2ct en men's 
non-revenue pr'Jducing sports. The fcllo-.,ri!1g section examines the 
positive and negative impacts that Title IX has, and may continue to have, 
on intercollegiate athletics. 
Section ~.4. ~itle IX's Ir:mact On :!:ntercoller"iate At:Ue~ics: 
' 11.. :'he ::tevolution In Honen 's .'i.thletics 
IX · · l' .. d · 1072 .:..:c···re'"er, ~t · .. r3.~ ."'ot ·mtil Title ·,;as orlClna .L'J enac ue ln -> • • • - - - .. 
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1974 that HEW first included intercollegiate athletics within the scope 
of its regulations. Furthermore, congressional approval of the HEW 
policy interpretations was not finalized until December of 1979. Hone-
theless, many intercollegiate athletic departments felt obliged to begin 
complying with Title IX in the early 1970's. Faced w~th the prospect of 
having all federal financial aszistance cut off because of gender dis-
crimination in athletics, "many schools made the changes prior to the 
ll6 
release of the regulations." 
The remarks of Dick Schultz, Cornell University Athletic Director, 
are representative of the responses to Title LC's threat of losing federal 
aid for noncompliance: 
"without (~itle IX), we'd have difficulty going to 
the administration for additional funds just on 
the merits of building a better women's sports 
program. It's ahrays easier when they have to 
do it. Title IX supplies the impetus".ll7 
The belief that Title IX is the driving force behind the ongoing 
revolution in w-omen's athletics is also held by Gail :Bigglestone. '.i'he 
Homen's Director of Athletics at the University of Hew Hampshire credits 
Title IX for the strides made in women's athletic programs. She says that 
although the adnlinistration of !lew Hanpshire ;.ranted to increa~e the aid 
given to women's athletics, "Title IX ·Has the impetus b8hind the whole 
118 
effort of the university." 
~emarks are not the only evi:lence that Title IX has had a positive 
impact or: the e7owth of women's athletics. Statistics also reYeal a 
definite revolution is taking place, one that coincid~s ·with the histO~J 
of this statute. 
In the three ;,rear period (1974-1977) follmdng !:Zvl' s ir.clusion of 
intercollegiate athletics as fallir.g >Ti thin Title IX' s regulatio:1s: 
the money budgeted by colleges and • ..tniversi ties for athletics 
.. ' t all t ' t • - 1 "'-- ,...cf " l ~ :1a •,ras oca eu o ,·TOr.J.e:, s prograr:1s rose _ .L on c::. ,; vO near y 
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8:;: 119 p. 
the number of colleges offering athletic scholarships in-
creased from 60 to more than 500. 120 
The gains made in women's sports are even greater when viewed 
from the time Title IX 1va.s passed to Congress' approval of the final 
policy interpretations (1972-1980): 
the budget for women's athletic programs as comoared to 
the total athletic budget has risen from less than 1% 
to over 16%.121 
Before passage of Title IX, no colleges or universities 
offered athletic scholarships to women. In 1975, 5000 
were offered and in 1980~ 10,000 athletic grant-in-aids 
were awarded to ·Homen.l2c 
Participation by women i~ inter~olll~~ate athletics has 
increased 25o% in this tL~e per~od. 
These overall statistics describing the growth of women's 
athletics are substantial indicators of an ongoing revolution in college 
sports. However, data obtained from individual colleges and universities 
present additional evidence of the tremendous impact that this leeis-
lation has had on their women's programs. The follo~ng arc ~tatistic~ 
compiled from five different institutions: 
University of Califor:Jia, Berkeley= 
In 1972-73, the entire women'~ athletic b~dge~ was only 
$5,000. This was increased 100~: the followir.~ year 
to $50,000. Hm.,.cver, this representee only 2';S of the 
':otal athletic bt:.dGet. In 1976-77, the v;~men's share 
increased to 14~·; of the total budget ( .$442, COO) .12 ,_. 
Cornell University= 
3efore Title :L{ there ~•ere only three spor':s operating em 
a $12,000 a year b11dget. In 1979-20, ':he :'igures had 
ballo::med to 16 teaz sports ( pl'.lS 4 cl],!b sport~) ~-ri th an 
ar.nual budget in excess of $34o,coo.12 ' 
l 
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University of New Hampshire= 
The year Title IX uas passed, women's programs could boast 
only eight sports, no scholarships, and only part-time 
coaches. In 1981-82, the number rose to 13 sports, 24 
of the 190 ,.,omen athletes on scholarship, eight full-time 
coaches, two full-time trainers, a part-time sports in-
formation d~rector, and a women's assistant athletic 
director. 12 
u.c.L.A.= 
Women's athletic budget almost tripled from 1974-75 to 1976-77, 
$180,000 to $450,000. The number of head coaches, assistant 
coaches, and staff positions also doubled during this period. 
In 1976-77, 23% of the women participating in interc~llegiate 
athletics (65 of 200) were on athletic scholarships. 7 
Washington State= 
Judge Philip Faris recently awarded between $157,000 to 
$400,000 to be distributed among 12 coaches and 485 women 
athletes in compensation for discriminatory practices by 
the school's athletic department. !.fore importantly, the 
judge set financial guidelines that require 37.5% of all 
athletic funds be allocated to women's programs. This 
figure is to grow at 2 per cent a year unti~8it equals 44%, the percentage of women at the university.l~ 
While these figures constitute great strides made in the ~ea of 
'ramen's athletics, many feel that they are not enough. Especially since 
the ~fl interpretations dictate proportional allocation of scholarships, 
~oaches salaries, and general f~ds. As G~il Bigglestone notes, accordi~g 
to this proportional interpretation, Cornell •ramen athletes should be 
allocated 35 to 40 scholarships instead of the 24 pre.sently a~·,ardec. 
She says, '\.,.e're still not where ·,;e should be. ~oie've ~ace pro{;Tess, 
• 1 , .,129 
cut 1 t s very, very s.Lm;. 
-:Lhese figures, ba:::ed ::m the 1974-75 acadenic year, are evidence 
ot "':he long road ahead :..n the 'mmen' s revolution far proportional equality 
in in~ercollegiate athletics: 
at. the :_·r.i·:ersi :y of South Alaba:-:-.a, the :::er. operatc:d on a 
.?2CO, CCO bud ,:set; :·ror.:en received :?2., COC. 
(136) 
at the University ::>f Utah, the women's budget rose fran 
$3,000 to $53,000; the men's remained at $1.1 million. 
at Memphis State, the men's budget 1vas $1.5 million; the1~0 >vomen asked !'or $21,000 yet were allocated only .$l5,5CO. j 
l·Iore up-to-date figures reveal that ,.;hile Homen's pr0grams are 
steadily increasi~g, as is their per cent of the overall budget, they 
still have a long •.-ray to go. This is most e\"ident by this 1980 national 
statistic: while 3Cf;~ of all intercollegiate athletes are women, the 
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average >T:::>men's program recei·res only 16.4% of the total atb~etic budget. 
These figures represent the fact that there are 0bviously a lot 
of institutions not in full campliance with the F.Ed regulation:::. In-
deed, the 'da:nen 's Equity Acti:::>n League has .:::ompiled a list of over 133 
complaints accusing colleges and universities oi' sex discrin:inati:::>:J in 
ath1etics. 132Hhile it is rare i'or a judge to penalize an athleUc depart-
oent, as o~~urred in the /lashir.gton State case, the real penalty for n:::>n-
com.r;lia:1ce has never been hancl:::d out: less of all federal financi::.l 
assistance. Until the Office 0f Civil ?.i[!:~t::: does pe::alize an institutian 
in this fashion, Ewald B. Eyquist' s predicti:m :-:".a:; h:::>ld t·::-ue: 
...-. 
".::q•,lity for • ..;o;y;en in collegiate at:U~t.ics ·:.3.:~ nat 
Ce achieved ~o!' co~e tiMe. • • • ·.::1e _r..r0C l·::~ 
~orne:: must overco~e (i:::) ~he afore~~~t~oned 
rP:!.:ucta!1ce af ur.i ''ersi ~:; pi·es:.dcr. ";::: :o ':a:-::1_::..~· 
:'·~~l:t .. ~1ith .. r~tle ::(.''1::,~ 
., ..... ,, 
! ., __ 
l'":ar~ 3. C.a:-:::::..t;~~-..: -:.!·:p:tc~ o:-~ ··.on-::--2 ... ~e::,.1e _;:~-:>,->.:~:.!"!:_; sp':lr'7:.~. -- .:·~::..:::·:"~L_ ~~--::..::..:. :.:1::~.:--
-~ _ .... 
..J-
'~-
l"'!""" pe':".3.lized. JJ 
( ,-::~) _ _,( 
:':)otball and the minor 
, --:(, 
is :-.iscall:t di.sa..st2'":JUS ~ .6-- · ::H;-
''Some of the r:1en' s pr:>t;ra.r.ls are be in;:; eli.::U::a ~2d 
and d:-opped froo. our .~ollege car.:puGe;:; to::lay ::;ir::pl;_; 
because the~· are not self-scrpportine:;. • •• (· .. 1h2n) 
•,.;e tal<:e 'che profit fY')m t:1e revenue prodcrcir.g 
spor+.s and Eiv~ it to •,.;omen 's i:1terc-:Jllecia"':e 
athletics, we have to drop '::he pr8[T?...':lS of ~rue]:, 
baseball, GOlf, and tennis f':Jr the ~en. 
E\·e:1.tually I~can see a iyinG process f':lr u:-:.1 
athleti.cs."1 ..:J7 
'1:o::: Osborn~, football coach, University of :icbr-asl:a: 
2..3 t!-::?..t 1·Te d.Jn 't .See ~Ihere 'the ::l:Jne:J'" is c::i::g 
to co~e fr'Jmg • The 3ol~tion ~a!; bee~"! 
1-:ici.esprea:i proposals to eli:::ina:.e n.t:,leti~ 
sran~s fgr (the sports) ':.h::.t :l'.J n'.Jt ::-.a~:e 
:n'.Jney. ".L..:;·~ 
"In :n.l!" conference, -:::ere is a ~eal di: ..... :'e!"er:.~~ 
af opinia!1 3.S to -:;=-:eti~r tne:r ~-rant -:e> ~onti~ .. ue 
'-ri th a broad spectruo of in ~er:::olle~ia -:e 
at:-ue:,:.cs. Se"rcral a: the ~.;.n:..versi :ies :.!'"~ -:>u.r 
~~:1fere::ce hr...,.re !-!ad ~o ;::_,_ .. e ,..:.p spo::t.:, eit:~~! .. 
:he sc~olarshlps :or ':hese spar:,~ or ~~1st 
give ~p pa=~~ci;ation in t~ese ~po:-ts ~1-
toc:: theY. •·l.::;! 
__ _j 
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Representatives of intercollegiate athletic progra~s are not the 
only ones predicting negative results for men's non-revenue sports. 
Newspaper editorials have also been printed prognosticating the demise of 
these programs: 
From the V10nroe (La. ) News Star : 
"At a time when many schcols find it difficult 
enough to balance their books, they may simply 
decide the easy answer to a highly charged 
situation is to cut the athletic progra~H8wn 
to that part which can pay its mm way." · 
From the Tulsa World: 
"If •,.;omen's sports have to be given as much 
money, personnel and emphasis as men's, it's 
going to be - in the vernacular - a new 
ball game. Hore money will have to be 
raised or funds will have to be taken from 
the present sports program."l41 
From the Chicap;o Daily Hews: 
"The (HEW) rules >rill have an effect on the 
strapped financial circ~tances ~any 
colleges find themselves in. Either more 
funds will have to be raised for women's 
athletics or the present funds will have 
to be ~i¥~rted from the men to the 
women. 
While these opinions and editorial co~ents present, for the most 
part, subjective speculations on the state of coll~t;e atr~etics, tile harsh 
realities of Title IX's impact on men's programs has claimed various inter-
collegiate prograr::s. Tvrs ::mch non-revenue sports aci'rersely affected are 
the l·rrestling program at Geor~ia a:-.d the r::en 's s•,;irr.:ning tea:":'. at Hashingtor:. 
Ge:Jrgia Athletic Director Vince Dool::y said !;hat the decisi-=m to 
drop ·,.Testlin.;; ·,.;as "s-:rictly a ~atter of econo::lics" 'brought on by the 
143 
:re :aid that it w: .. s either drop or.e spc;rt or 
'\rater dmm" several sports in order to di·rert fu!1ds t:J the •,.;or.:en 's 
l4h 
progran:s. 
(139) 
At the University of Washington, the school decided to eliminate 
scholarships for male athletes in non-revenue producing sports. When 
the State Attorney General reviewed the HEW regulations, "he immediately 
advised the University of Washington to cancel all grant-in-aid to all 
male athletes except in football and basketball. The u.1i versi ty did 
145 
II 
so. 
While the "they're-going-to-rob-Peter-to-pay-Paula, theory is 
gaining ffiomentum on college campuses, there are many who believe it is a 
fallacy to believe that Title IX will result in the ruination of men's 
146 
athletics. For every example of a ~en's program being dropped, they 
cite an athletic director who says that a school can comply with ~itle IX 
without hurting the men's sports. In fact, Yale Athletic Director Frank 
Ryan says that in making Yale's women's budget the biggest in the Ivy 
147 
League, no significant changes were made in the men's sports budget. 
The following is a sample of the rebuttal arguments made with regard 
to this theorJ that Title IX has a negative impact on men's non-revenue 
producing sports: 
The Women's Equity Action League: 
"There is no evidence· that nen'::; prograns natiomride 
are being cut to accon:.-r.oda te '\·Tome D.'::; athletics. 
In fact, among the riCAA 's top di vi::don schools, the 
entire sum allocated to women's sports bet•,Teen -
1972 and 1978 came to less than hal~1g~ tr.e bud~et increases in mer.'::; sports programs.l 
Senator Birch Bayh: 
"I d::m 't think it is r.ecessarJ for us to prest::ae 
that in order to give the ~;o::Jen ::;tt.;.dents in an 
institution adequate participation in physical 
educatior. this is going to destro:r the ~e!1 '::; 
.. ~~:::, progra.'":'l It -- "" 
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At the University of Washington, the school decided to eliminate 
scholarships for male athletes in non-revenue producing sports. When 
the State Attorney General reviewed the HEW regulations, "he immediately 
advised the University of Washington to cancel all grant-in-aid to all 
male athletes except in football and basketball. The u.1iversity did 
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II so. 
While the "they're-going-to-rob-Peter-to-pay-Paula" theory is 
gaining ffiomentum on college campuses, there are many who believe it is a 
fallacy to believe that Title IX will result in the ruination of men's 
146 
athletics. For every example of a men's program being dropped, they 
cite an athletic director who says that a school can comply with Title IX 
without hurting the men's sports. In fact, Yale Athletic Director Frank 
Ryan says that in making Yale's women's budget the biggest in the Ivy 
147 
League, no significant changes were made in the men's sports budget. 
The following is a sample of the rebuttal arguments made with regard 
to this theory that Title IX has a negative impact on men's non-revenue 
producing sports: 
The Women's Equity Action League: 
"There is no evidence-that men's programs nationw-ide 
are being cut to accommodate vromen 's athletics. 
In fact, among the NCAA's top division schools, the 
entire sum allocated to women's sports between · 
1972 and 1978 came to less than half1o~ the budget I U q~ increases in men s sports programs. 
Senator Birch Bayh: 
"I don't think it is necessary for us to presume 
that in order to give the women students in an 
institution adequate participation in physical 
education this is going to destroy the men's 
program • Ill . 9 
' 
-------
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Representative Blouin: 
"I am not as concerned, frankly, about the effect 
it has on men 1 s colJe gia te sports. So what if 
it does hurt. That in itself is an indication 
there has been discrimination for years1 and that it is time we balance things off." 50 
Ann Uhlir, former Executive Director, Association for Inter-
collegiate Athletics for Homen: 
"It's like saying I have enough money to feed my 
boy children, but not my girl children. Parents 
have to find a way to feed both their sons and 
daughters."l51 
Even the newspapers have written editorials refuting those that 
claim HEW's policy regulations endanger men's programs: 
From the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin: 
"The ominous warnings that the regulations 
will imperil male sports programs are 
questionable. There is little chance that 
the guidelines will affect the big-time 
programs • • • and some of the smaller ones 
are already in trouble because they're over-
extended."l52 
From the Cleveland Plain Dealer: 
"What the NCAA and the congressmen seemed to 
have overlooked is HEW's point-blank statement 
that it's regulations do not require exactly 
equal expenditures for male and female 
students or for men's and women's teams. 
It does not seem to us that the regulations 
endanger any existing programs."l5.:$ 
Whether or not this statute has had a negative inpact on non-
revenue producing sports is a topic of hot debate which requires a statist-
ical study in order to examine Title IX's impact on both women's and r.1en's 
athletics. However, it is doubtful if even a highly sophisticated research 
design could prove or disprove a causal relationzhip between this legis-
lation's emphasis on women's athletics resulting in the demise ~f ~en's 
programs. 
(141) 
Additional funds are being sought to expand women's intercollegiate 
athletic programs to comply with Title IX's regulations. This has 
fabricated new dilemmas in educational institutions "at a time when student 
enrollments are leveling off, legislative support is limited, and the in-
154 
flationary spiral is continuing upward." Nonetheless, the HEW regulations 
can be seen as a long overdue opportunity to alleviate gender discrimin-
ation in our colleges and universities. Even if Title IX adversely affects 
men's athletic programs, thereby threatening the favored position of male 
155 
sports, there are many who view this as a result of societal trends. Or, 
as Representative Shirley Chisholm states: 
"I think we have to recognize that Title IX will 
go against certain basic traditions in our 
nation. Many have been quite comfortable, and 
many do not desire to rock the proverbial boat. 
However, this does not mean that we should not 
be responsive to the large segment of society 
which is now demanding their fair share."l56 
Section 3.5 In My Opinion: 
A. Title IX's Impact On Intercollegiate Athletics 
Some people argue that providing equal educational opportunities 
to women threatens an American tradition. However, a tradition offered 
157 
to only half our population is not very American. 
The benefits associated with Title IX that have provided the 
impetus for the revolution in women's athletics must unfortunately come 
at the expense of certain men's programs. Since the funds necessarJ to 
upgrade women's athletics are usually obtained from the men's programs, 
male non-revenue producing sports are often negatively affected. He'.rer-
theless, achievement of equality of opportunity in educational institutions, 
the major thrust of the Title IX stipulations, is an extremely praiseworthy 
(142) 
goal which should be strived for at all costs. 
As with gender discrimination, the prohibition of race discrimin-
ation has been nnpopula:r with many people. Southern plantation owners 
cried "foul" when President Lincoln signed the Em·1ncipation Proclamation 
because it had adverse financial and social effects on them. Policies 
that promote social change often have certain drawbacks to certain groupso 
But when the policy is designed to abolish something that is wrong, it 
should be carried out irregardless of the negative side-effects it elicits. 
Sex discrimination in American colleges and universities is also 
v~ong. Even though many people involved in intercollegiate athletics 
emphasize its adverse implications, equal athletic opportunities should 
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be "supported by strong and vigorously enforced federal legislation." 
Title IX is that legislative enforcer of equity in educational programs 
and activities. However, its goals will not be fully met until the 
courts and Congress can consistently define their positions. 
Congress took a significant step in that direction last month. 
Overwhelmingly supporting Representative Claudine Schneider's institution-
ally interpreted proposal, the legislative branch has indicated its 
intention that Title IX "not be amended or altered in any nanner which 
\vill lessen comprehensive coverage" of equal opportunities for women in 
159 
educational progr~s and activities. 
How, it is up to the Supreme Court to decide whether Title IX is 
to be applicable to all programs and activities at a school receiving 
federal financial assistance. Due to the Justice Department's decision 
to ::;eek only a narrow rtuing in the pending Grove City College case, it is 
doubtfuJ. that the high court -;vill is::;ue a broad i:1stitutional ir.terpret-
ation. :::'hus, until the Supreme Court does address this ir:;.portant issue, 
(143) 
athletic directors will continue to avoid full compliance with the Title 
IX regulations. 
B. The Sports Triangle 
Judicial litigation and congressional legislation h~had an 
incredible impact in American athletics as a result of Title IX. Due to 
Congress' passage of this act and the subsequent Hfl~ policy regulations, 
colleges and universities have been forced to restructure :heir athletic 
programs. As a result, there is a current revolution in ~omen's athletics 
that is allowing vmmen the opportunities once availatle to me'1 oply. 
Gone forever are the days when a Donna deVaronna must retire from competition 
the year after winning.an 01~1pic cold medal because no one w~ll offer her 
a scholarship. 
However, the sports triangle has not canpleted its interpretation 
of this anti-discri:r.linating statute. Hhile Cong:r-ess has recently cemented 
its position ':lith regard to Title IX's scope of applicstion, the courts 
have not. Still hung up over deciphering the c:..rr:bie;uous congre.ss.:.onal 
inte~tions at the tirr_e of Title :C{'s passage, the ju_dicia.r:l is u~ired :.n 
its or.·rn cGnflic-'-:.int; interpretation~o l\.s a :."'c=::~.:.lt, :.t i:: ;:;till D .... Y"lcie~r~:::~::_~leC:. 
":1h~t~·1e~ ~i tle I:C ~·Till be an c::f:-.r?cti -r.-~? fo:·~ce -:'o:_" s ?.:: eq~i. ~:- 3.:1 1:h:~ :_: :::::.!.0(_)2..:: 
::::o 
''~~he u.:.~ce:t·tCL:!.~lt~· c:f ~.=it:e IJ:' 2 :.·_)v.":i_!l~_:.i.r:c if:lcpact 
on c~lle,:;:_:..tc .s.t:UPtic l~Y!.~ae:::-arn.s "'::---:.:!'~2-.tet:~ -':h~ 
:.:'·_::.·":!'le:r- gY8,;th of li'One:1' :~ r:o~lege sports. If 
~tle '.!a~ts ~ind that Tit}.~ ::~ ._::;es ~-'J4: p!"CJ:::·:::~i::~'~ 
:_:ender c.::.:cr::.p·~-~-:-:.:.t:~ _ _jn ill. ·:''Jl~.-?:_:~ ::par-:s _;;1--~z:.~::.:::c;, 
::10 cu:~Yi~r .. t~:r ::'"'t!·~·~--,snizecl :-~(:<:-:::: .. c._:_ ~::!')· -~!:--o~_.': ._ ... c;-
cr.:i:::.""'i~-~:= :=:~::--~·_f-i_,::~.::-: -~::p-::::--.i:_ :.~IT::·: :'~Jr· ~.-:-8~~::·~-· t :~ 
~~~~lie~~-~~= .. ri:...:_ r'2~~:c-.i.:·~. ~;i -:~::;~;-~ SJ.,_rer.::.:.~e.:.~~:::..:_ 
!'·.=s-:l""'o..j_l1~.:, :;.; 2.~.ec_:~s 2-..rz:: ·_:nl~~--·:=:!_:,r t:; ~8r.;.-::.::r;.e...; 
t .J ::..r:crease -t l1e :.:~.;.C>:lr1t.~,... Tf c~ane~~ e..p_pr':)_pri:J.. ted 
to ~-:0r.:e.n's 2..::iJ..s-::.cs'"n..L·.::~ 
(144) 
~n conclusion, Congress demonstrated a clear policy against gender 
ciisc!"imination with the enactment of Title IX. While the early history 
of this legislation denotes conflicting and ambiguous congressional 
intentions, the legislators have recently focused their intentions on a 
broad, instit~tional application of Title IX's regulations. The courts 
have also articulated a desire to ensure equal educational opport~ities. 
:1m-rever, the judicial branch has not resolved its conflict over ~i tle I:~' s 
scope of application. As the courts reconcile their conflicting inter-
pretations, 11 the paramount consideration should be the goal of alleviating 
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past inequities while providing full athletic opportunity for both sexes." 
Only then will the goals of this statute reach its full fruition. 
(145) 
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APPENDIX "I II 
Public Law 92-318 (June 23, 1972) 
TITLE IX - PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMlllATION 
Sex Discrimination Prohibited 
Sec. 90l.(a) No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance, except that: 
(1) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this 
section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, 
professional education, and graduate higher education, and to 
public institutions of undergraduate higher education; 
(2) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this 
section shall not apply (A) for one year from the date of enact-
ment of this Act, nor for six years after such date in the case 
of an educational institution which has begun the process of 
changing from being an institution :·;hich admits only students of 
one sex to being an institution which admits students of both 
sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change 
which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or (B) for seven 
years from the date an educational institution begins the process 
of changing from being an institution which admits only students 
of only one sex to being an institution which admits students of 
both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a 
change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education, 
lvhichever is the later; 
(3) this section shall not apply to an educational institution 
which is controlled by a religious organization if the application 
of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious 
tenets of such organization; 
(4) this section shall not apply to an educational institution 
whose primary purpose is the training of individuals for the 
military services of the United States, or the merchant marine; and 
(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any 
public institution of undergraduate higher education which is an 
institution that traditionally and continually from its establish-
ment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex. 
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be inter-
preted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or 
disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons 
(160) 
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of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally 
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or 
percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or 
other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to 
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this title of 
statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with 
respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such 
program or activity by the members of one sex. 
(c) For purposes of this title an educational institution means any 
public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any 
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that 
in the case of an educational institution composed of more than one school, 
college, or department which are administratively separate units, such 
term means each such school, college, or department. 
(161) 
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Section 86.41 provides as follows: 
86.41 Athletics. 
(1) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently 
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any inter-
scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by 
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately 
on such basis. 
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate 
teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon 
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, 
where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for 
members of one sex. • .and athletic opportunities for members of that 
sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be 
allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a 
contact sport. For the purpose of this part, contact sports include 
boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other 
sports, the purpose of major activity of which involves bodily contact. 
(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors 
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall pro-
vide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining 
whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, 
among other factors: 
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interest and abilities of members of both 
sexes; 
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance; 
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
(vi) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; 
( ... ) ,VJ.~~ Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 
(ix) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; 
{x) Publicity. 
( 162) 
APPENDIX "II" CONTllruED 
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal 
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors 
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but 
the Director may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for 
teams of one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of 
each sex. 
( 163) 
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GROWTH Jll COLLEGE PARTICIPATION, 1971 - 76 
SPORTS NUMBER OF SCHOOLS 
'71-72 '72-73 '73-74 '74-75 -75-76 
Basketball 215 346 466 600 640 
Volleyball 181 285 396 467 594 
Tennis 198 300 417 5o6 560 
Softball 120 175 254 303 342 
S'iTimming & Diving 135 213 265 298 327 
Track & Field 76 138 180 226 283 
Field hockey 165 213 249 284 256 
Gymnastics 123 182 238 263 246 
Golf 77 132 145 155 165 
Badminton 70 98 124 125 117 
TOTAL AIAT.tl 301 409 603 739 843 
:t-1EMBER SCHOOLS 
From a Dece~~er 1976 survey by the Association for Intercollegiate 
Athletics for Women of the number of its member schools offering 
intercollegiate competition for women. 
Reprinted from: Y..adzielski, Mark A. "Postsecondary Athletics in an era of' 
Equality: An Appraisal of the Effect of' Title IX." 5 Journal of Colle~e 
and U~iversity Law (1979). pp 132-133. See 45 C.F.R. Part 86, Sect. 8 .41. 
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*SCHOOLS WOMEN'S ATHLETICS l.mN'S ATHLEriCS WOMEN'S % OF TOTAL 
Indiana $2l8,000 $3,500,000 5.86% 
Iow-a $250,000 $2,000,000 ll.ll% 
Michigan $l80,000 $5,000,000 3.47% 
Michigan State $256,000 $4,500,000 5.38% 
Hinnesota $4oo,ooo $3,400,000 l0.53% 
Ohio State $300,000 $5,700,000 5. oc:f1/o 
Wisconsin $209,000 $2,2l7,000 8.62% 
Average $259,000 $3,759,7l4 7.l4% 
*Figures unavailable for Illinois, Purdue, and .North1vestern. Budgets listed 
may not include the total money spent since some salaries and administrative 
costs may be reflected·in other budgets. 
Reprinted from: Kadzielski, Mark A. "Postsecondary Athletics in an era of 
Equality: An Appraisal of the Effect of Title IX." 5 Journal of College and 
University Law (l979). pp l32-l33. See 45 C.F.R. Part 86, Sect. 86.4l. 
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Inconsistent Judicial Interpretations of Title IX 
1. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n., 424 F. Supp. 
732 (1976), revised per cuffiam F. 2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977). 
Female high school basketball player claimed that six-player, 
half-court basketball rules denied her full benefits of the game and pre-
vented her from obtaining a college athletic scholarship. Contended that 
this vms in violation of equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment. 
Also claimed right to relief under Title IX. District court ruled in favor 
of girl although not interpreting Title IX as granting a private right of 
action. However, 6th Circuit Court reversed the lower court's decision to 
strike the rules as being a deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment right. 
2. Jones v. Secondary School Activities Ass'n., 453, F. Supp. 150 
(W.D. Okla. 1977). 
Same issue as Cape. Court dismissed those portions dealing 
with Title IX on the grounds that plaintiff had not exhausted all adndnistrat-
i ·.re remedies. · Likeui:::e, ruled that six-player rules do not constitute equal 
protection U.eprivation of the Fourteenth Amendment. · 
3. Aiken v. UniYer3ity of Oregon, 39 OR. App. 779 (1979). 
Parents of members of 110men 's basketball team claimed University 
cf Oregon's intercollegiate athletic department ·.riolated Title IX ,n. th 
reso.rd to :mequal: transportation, officiating, coaching, and eorr.mitment 
on behn.lf ::lf the u.r1iverdty. Court ruled thn.t all programs i·Tithin the 
i~stitution are subject to Title IX regulations. 
!~. ~effel ..,, . :·!j.sco:1sin :nte~scholantic .. it:1l~~ic A3s '~., J,!;l; ? • 8upp. 
-----------, 
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F~r.!ale high school hase'baJ_l p2.ayer claimc.:i that rule prohioi t-
ing girls ti1e opportunity to play :::ontact sports in mixed competition :_s con-
trar:,r t':' P.qt;.al _i?T':)t~ction clause of Fourteenth An:endn:cnt. l-llU' s policy 
ir~terp:retatio:ts of Title IX, 'vhich perr!lits eG.ucaticnal instit1~ti::ms fr'J:n 
excluding sirls and 1mme:1 f1·c~ can tact SIJorts, ;·raG also contended. Co'..~=+; 
ruled in favor of the girl st::..ting +;hat congressional er:.::.ctr:::2:1ts ce.r:not 
preerr:pt constitutional provisi::ms. 
:=;. lhticmal C::~-~e;::.ate At:.uet:.c Ass':-1. v. Ca}_-i-"'a!D, 1~~~.;. :-. Sc'-.i?P· 
425 (1978), reyised 622 ::". 2d 13F:2 (1)8C). 
':'he NCAA instituted declaratory and-injunctive relief in an 
attempt to invalidate the 1-<::E.'l regulations vThich include intercollegiate 
athleti~s vdthin the purvievT of Title IX. District court ruled that the 
HCAl\. lacked standing to sue. Appeals court reverned, and sent the case 
back to the Kansas City district court where litigation is pending. 
6. Hutchins v. Board of Trustees of Ivlichie;an State University, 
C.A. No. G 79-87 (1979). 
\·lomen 's basketball team :Oiled complaint that university violated 
Title IX's sex discrimination prohibitions by giving the men's 1::-asketball 
tea~ ~ore money for travelling, better facilities, etc. Although litigation 
is pending, the court issued a tempor~J restraining order barring Michigan 
State from giving its men's teams better treatment than its women's teams. 
7. Dodson v. Arkansas Act~vities Ass'n., 468 F. Supp. 394 (1979). 
?emale basketball player sought an injunction to stop the hie;h 
school ansociation from ioposing the six-player rules in games. Alth0ugh 
she ~von the case or. Fourteenth Amendment g!'Ounds, ~he court used a program-
l 
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speci~ic interpretation o~ Title IX thereby throwing out the Title IX 
contention since the programs and activities concerned in this case 
Nere not the beneficiaries of federal financial assistance. 
8. ~ v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 
659 (1979). 
Different type o~ Title IX litigation as a male athlete 
sought injunctive relief against the school district to allow him to 
play on an all-girls' volleyball team since there was no boys' volleyball 
team. The court ruled in favor o~ the boy, thus interpreting HEW's reg-
ulations, which prohibit the disallowing o~ members of bne sex from partie-
ipating with members of the other sex when there is no team for the excluded 
sex, as working in favor o~ either sex. 
9- Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
- . 
Female high school student sought a pe~anent injunction pro-
hibiting sex discrimination on the school's golf team. Although the district 
court acknovrledged the need to provide -vmmen with an equal opportunity in all 
aspects o~ life, including athletics, it ruled against the female athlete. 
The court held that the HEW regulati0ns ad~pted under Title IX were invalid 
since they contained an institutional application of this legislation, when 
its original language required only a program-specific application. 
10. Be~~ett v. West Texas State University, 527, F. Supp. 77 (N.D. 
Tex. 198i). 
Six female students who participated in the university's 
intercollegiate athletic program sued the school ~or alleged discriminatory 
policies and practices which are prohibited by Title IX. University officials 
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claimed that since the athletic department did not directly receive 
federal fUnds, the athletic program was outside the scope of Title IX. 
The district court issued a program-specific ruling in favor of the 
university. 
11. HQ.ff'er v. Temple University, 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
Similar to Bennett, as women at Temple claimed the university's 
athletic department was in violation of Title IX.· Likewise, the university 
argued that its athletic program should not be required to comply with 
Title IX regulations since intercollegiate athletics are not directly 
assisted by federal funds. However, this district court gave an institutional 
interpretation of Title IX thus ruling in favor of the women. 
12. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 102 s. Ct. 1927 (1982). 
This case did not involve intercollegiate athletics, per se, but 
it did deal with Title IX. The u.s. Supreme Co~t ruled that Title IX pro-
hibits sex discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal 
assistance and is applicable to employees as well as students. However, 
it did not specifically address the question of whether Title IX covers all 
programs at an institution receiving federal assistance, or only those 
programs directly assisted. 
13. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (G.D. Va. 1982). 
It had been reported to the Department of Education (DOE) that 
the university was in violation of Title IX regulations. The university sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent DOE from investigating its inter-
collegiate athletic program since it did not ~eceive direct aid. The court 
----------------
---- - ------------------------- -
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interpreted North Haven to be program-specific and thereby ruled in favor 
of the university. 
14. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F. 2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Private coeducational institution which receives no federal 
assistance other than aid to its students filed suit seeking an order to 
declare void the DOE's termination of student financial assistance based 
on the institution's failure to comply with Title IX. The appeals court 
reversed the district court's decision, ruling that North Haven should be 
interpreted institutionally thereby stating that Title IX's regulations are 
not limited to those programs 1rhich receive direct federal assistance. 
This appendix consolidates information obtained from: 
Atkins, Jeanne. "Courts Say What Schools 1-iust Do For Girls' Sports." 
In the Running. February, 1982. insert 
Current Legal Trends and Developments in the Entertainment and Sports 
Industries. Beverly Hills, Calif.: The American Bar Association, 
1979. pp. 4-9. 
"?IT 1 K . A "T.;tle IX·. 1ve son,.. eVJ.n • ... Women's Collegiate Athletics in Limbo." 
Washington and Lee Law Review. 1983, p. 303. 
Snorts and the Courts: Physical Education and Sports Law ~uarterly. 
Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring, 1983. p. 13. 
